Mamzerut

A Teshuvah of the Rabbinical Assembly Committee of Law and Standards

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She’elah:

Is mamzerut operative in our community?

Teshuvah:

Why is this teshuvah necessary?

At first impression the issue of mamzerut in the Conservative Movement is settled. The Rabbinical Assembly Committee of Law and Standards has held on two occasions that "the institution of mamzerut is inoperative.” This halakhically pivotal holding is contained in the minutes of the meeting of June 23, 1970 and was reaffirmed by a smaller Steering Committee on February 14, 1977. There is no record of the votes and only a sparse written discussion. No responsa on mazerut were ever submitted. The lack of written analysis conformed to the workings of an earlier era of the Law Committee.
Since 1985 a responsum is written prior to a Law Committee vote. Responsa provide legal analysis and focal points of discussion. Such a written record serves to explain our rationale to our colleagues and to educate our larger constituency. The reasoning and decisions of the Law Committee define who we are as a Halakhic Movement. There is a need to revisit mamzerut with a thorough analysis because this halakhic question goes to the core of how we as Conservative Jews address the clash between a Torah precept and moral sensibilities. The purpose of this responsum is to decide anew and to provide the underlying halakhic reasoning of our movement’s stand on mamzerut.

**Who is a mamzer and what are the consequences?**

**Torah Origins:**

Deuteronomy 23:3 condemns the mamzer:

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A mamzer shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; none of his descendants, even in the tenth generation, shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord.

This is the only place in the Torah in which the term mamzer is used. Many of the concepts in this verse are unclear, eliciting a variety of questions: Who is a mamzer? What does it mean to be prohibited “from entering the community?” Is the
ostracizing literally for ten generations? And why is the punishment for the \textit{mamzer} so severe?

\textbf{The ambiguity of the term \textit{mamzer}.} \newline

The word \textit{mamzer} appears in only one other place in the \textit{Tanakh}, Zechariah (9:6):

\begin{verbatim}
/οη,αηκκπιυτδη,ρφσογσατχρζν\chiαηχ
\end{verbatim}

And a \textit{mamzer} shall dwell in Ashdod, and I will cut off the pride of the Philistines.

The obscurity of the term led to a variety of interpretations. The Septuagint translated \textit{mamzer} as "offspring of a harlot."\textsuperscript{1} Abraham Geiger attributed the origin of the word to \textit{ρζ ὅγν}, "belonging to a foreign nation," which he understood as a condemnation of progeny of a gentile father and a Jewish mother.\textsuperscript{2} Both the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds contain Rabbi Abahu’s definition of \textit{mamzer} as a conjugation of \textit{ρζ ὅνω}, a "strange blemish," suggesting a defect in a newborn’s pedigree.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{The rabbinic definition.}

\textsuperscript{1} The reading is a result of changing the final \textit{resh} into a \textit{nun}. Louis Jacob’s “The Problem of the Mamzer,” in \textit{A Tree of Life} (Oxford, England: Alden Press, 1984), p. 257.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Urschrift and Uebersetzungen der Bibel} (Breslau, 1857), 54-55, cited in David Novak’s “The Conflict between Halakah and Ethics: The Case of Mamzerut,” \textit{Halakhah in a Theological Dimension} (Chico, CA: Scholar’s Press, 1985), p.13. Novak relates that this early definition of \textit{mamzerut} changed with Ezra’s promulgation of a shift to the mother as the source of religious identity.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin} 3:12, 64c, attributed to Abahu. The same idea is presented anonymously in \textit{Yevamot} 76b.
By the first half of the second century there was a consensus that a *mamzer* was the offspring of a forbidden union, but the rabbis disagreed in defining the nature of the forbidden union. The *Mishnah* of *Yevamot* (4:13) reads:

Who is a *mamzer*?

“[The offspring of] any union of near relationship to which the term ‘he shall not come’ applies.” These are the words of R. Akiva.

Simeon of Teman says, "[the offspring of] any union for which the penalty is excision at the hand of Heaven (*karet*).”

And the *Halakhah* is in accord with his words.

R. Joshua says, "[the offspring of] any union for which the penalty is death at the hand of the Court."

Said R. Simeon b. Azzai: "I found a family register in Jerusalem, in which it was recorded: ‘So-and-so is a *mamzer*, because he is the offspring of a married woman,’ which confirms the words of R. Joshua.”

The *Mishnah* states that the *Halakhah* follows the opinion of Simeon of Teman. His criteria of sexual acts prohibited by *karet* became the accepted definition of *mamzer* in the post-*Mishnaic* period and the rule is treated as a given in an anonymous *Mishnah*. In addition, Rabbi Joshua’s holding that the offspring of sexual acts that

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4 The content of this *Mishnah* is presented in an expanded form in *Sifre, Deuteronomy* 248.

5 *Kiddushin* 3:12.
warrant the death penalty also became accepted law. By the third century, a *mamzer* was defined as the issue of a couple whose sexual relationship is forbidden according to the Torah and is punishable by *karet* or death. Consequently, the definition of *mamzer* as contained in the Codes encompasses the following three scenarios:

1. A child born as a result of incest, namely where the union is prohibited by Jewish law (אַיִן) subject to the punishment of excision *karet* (רֵפַע) or the death penalty (יִשְׁדָּע אֹבֶר);\(^7\)

2. A child born of the sexual intercourse of a married woman with a man other than her lawful husband;\(^8\)

3. The child of a woman who, acting on the assumption that her husband had died, remarried and had a child from the second husband. When her first husband is proved to be alive the child from the second marriage is a *mamzer*.

The rabbis applied the Biblical verse to both men and women.\(^9\) Although Simeon of Teman defined *mamzer* as the offspring of any union punishable by *karet*, which would include sex with a menstruant woman, the Gemara exempted such a child as belonging to the category of *mamzerut*.\(^10\) Finally, a *mamzer* is not properly translated as a "bastard," which in English is an illegitimate child, a category that does not exist in rabbinic Judaism.

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\(^6\) In *Yevamot* 45a, the third century *Amora*, Rabbi Dimi speaks in the names of Rabbi Isaac ben Aboudimi and Yehudah HaNasi as saying that “if an idolator or slave had intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the child born of such a union is a *mamzer*."

\(^7\) *Shulkhan Arukh, Even HaEzer* 4:13.

\(^8\) *Kiddushin* 3:12; *Yevamot* 4:13. The categories of incest are listed in *Leviticus* 18: 6-18, 20.

\(^9\) *Yevamot* 45b; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi‘ah* 15:1; *Tur* and *Beit Yosef, Even ha-Ezer* 4; *Shulkhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer* 4:13.

\(^10\) *Yevamot* 4:13; *Sifrei, Deuteronomy* 248.

\(^11\) *Yevamot* 49 a-b.
What does it mean to be kept out of the "assembly of the Lord?"

On the surface the Biblical phrase might restrict access to the Temple, but the rabbis understood the phrase more broadly due to the context of the surrounding verses. The rabbis interpreted to be "kept out of the assembly of the Lord” as prohibiting the marriage between a mamzer and an Israelite. A mamzer could thereby only marry another mamzer, a convert or a freed slave, or a non-Jew. If a mamzer married an ordinary Jew, the penalty was lashes and immediate divorce and their offspring were mamzerim.

Except for the prohibitions of marriage, a mamzer was considered a full member of the Jewish community and was required to carry out all religious duties, including procreation. A mamzer was deemed a son and brother in respect to rules of inheritance, levirate marriage, and conduct towards parents. His birth released his father’s wife from the obligation of levirate marriage and halizah. The mamzer was eligible to hold any public office, including service as a civil judge and even

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12 As used in the following Biblical parallelism in Lamentations 1: 10.
13 Kiddushin 4:1; also see Yevamot 8:2, 76a; Kiddushin 72b.
14 Yevamot 45b; Kiddushin 69a. 74a’ Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah 15:33; Shulchan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:24.
15 Kiddushin 73a, note Rashi there; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah 15:7; Shulchan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:22.
16 “Although it is generally prohibited for a freeman [even a freeman who is prohibited from marrying into the congregation] to cohabit with a Canaanite slavewoman, a mamzer is permitted to do so; see Kiddushin 69a. See Tosaphos below 79a οηηοβο σι, for a reason as to why a mamzer is different in this regard.” Yevamos 78a, The Schottenstein Edition, Talmud Bavli (NY: Artscroll/Mesorah, 1999), fn. 30.
17 The Talmud records that the penalty for falsely calling someone a mamzer is lashes (Kiddushin 28a). The Tosaphot comments, the penalty for the false accusation is commensurate with the penalty for a mamzer marrying a Jew. This rule gets codified in Isserles’ Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 7:2. The requirement of an immediate divorce is stated in Shukhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:18; 22:24; 154:20.
18 Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 3:12, 64a; Yevamot 78b.
19 Yevamot 22a; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Nahalot 1:7; Shukhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 276:6.
20 Sanhedrin 32b; Kiddushin 76a. Maimonides holds that this applies even if all three judges were mamzerim- Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 2:9; also Shukhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 7:2.
theoretically becoming a king. The sages comment that a mamzer could achieve the status of a scholar, who took precedence over an ignorant High Priest.

And yet, there was also ambivalence as to the full participation of mamzerim in communal life. The Mishnah in Soferim (1:13) says that some hold that a Torah scroll written by a mamzer is unfit for use in the synagogue. Rabbi Moses Sofer (1762-1839) wrote that although a mamzer may receive ordination as a rabbi, a community should not appoint a mamzer as its rabbi. Even more amazing and cruel is the ruling of Ismael ha-Kohen of Modena (Italy, 1723-1811), who permitted the branding of a child’s forehead with the word mamzer, despite the rabbinic prohibition of tattoos, in order to prevent a violation of the biblical prohibition of marrying a mamzer. The twentieth century Munkacszer Rav, Zevi Hirsch Shapira of Czechoslovakia, mentioned in a responsum the extreme measure of tattooing the mamzer’s forehead and approved of it in theory.

What does the Torah mean by an exclusion for "ten generations?"

The Talmud understands "ten generations" as meaning forever. Although the child of a mamzer and another Jew is considered a mamzer, the rule allows for a

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21 Tosaphot to Yevamot 45b comments that a mamzer remains “thy brother,” which satisfies the requirement of Deuteronomy 17:15: “… from among your brethren shall you set a king over you.”
22 Horayot 3:8; 13a. Neither the Mishnah, nor the Talmud’s explication, define the term “takes precedence” in this specific case. The preceding Mishnah used the term “take precedence” to signify that the person would be saved first from danger; it is used in other Mishnaot to refer to which has priority in terms of recognition.
23 Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 281:4.
24 Hatan Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, Part II, No. 94.
26 Yevamot 8:3. This understanding is based on a gezerah shevah, an association of like words here and in the laws against Amonites and Moabites- Sifrei, Deuteronomy, Ki Tetze, sec. 249.
27 Kiddushin 67a.
loophole. The child of a male *mamzer* and a non-Jew is born a non-Jew, who is therefore not a *mamzer*\(^{28}\) and may convert to Judaism.

**The Ethical Problem.**

A child is born a marital pariah due to no fault of his or her own, but rather for the sins of his or her parent. The unfair anguish inflicted by this *halakhah* is already voiced in *Midrash Vayikra Rabbah* as follows:

"And I returned and considered all the oppressions that were done under the sun; and beheld the tears of those that were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressor there was power, but they had no comforter (Ecclesiastes 4:1)."

Daniel (Hanina) the Tailor interpreted this verse: "all the oppressions," these are the *mamzerim...* their mothers committed a sin and these humiliated ones are removed?! This one’s father had illicit sexual relations- What did he [the child] do? Why should it make a difference for him?

"They had no comforter," but "from the hand of their persecutors there is strength,” this is the Great Assembly of Israel which comes against them with the power of the Torah and removes them based on "no *mamzer* shall enter the congregation of the Lord (Deuteronomy 23:3).” Thus, God says, "I have to comfort

\(^{28}\) *Kiddushin* 3:12.
them,” because in this world they are refuse (κνξπ), but in the Messianic Age (τυχκ σηγκ) ... they are pure gold.29

Daniel the Tailor’s sympathy for the mamzer is reflected in a legal debate over whether the mamzer will be purified in the Messianic era and be permitted to marry freely. Rabbi Meir said no and Rabbi Jose said yes.30 The Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds are split as to whose opinion is correct. The former holds by Rabbi Meir and the latter by Rabbi Jose, with both citing the same Rabbi Joseph for concurrence!31 This debate reflects an ongoing split between those who interpreted scripture as literal and eternally binding regardless of an apparent moral grievance and those who were troubled by the moral implications and were willing to consider a promise of change, even if it had to wait for the messianic era.

Daniel the Tailor’s sympathy for the mamzer is linked to a Torah value emphasized by the prophets. The Torah says, "the fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of their] children, nor children for [the sins of their parents]; every person shall be put to death for his [or her] sin.”32 At the same time there is a second strand in Torah, at least on the literal level, which deals harshly with innocent children. We are told that God remembers wrongdoing until the third or fourth generation.33 The Moabites, the Torah declares, can never enter the people of Israel.34 We are commanded to wipe out the Amalekites in every generation, because of what their ancestors did to us.35 And there is

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29 Midrash Vayikrah Rabbah 32:8; and in a shorter version, Ecclesiastes Rabbah 4:1.
31 Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 313m, 64d and Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 72b.
32 Deuteronomy 24:16.
33 Exodus 20:5; 34:7; Numbers 14:18.
34 Deuteronomy 23: 4-8; Nehemiah 13:1.
35 Exodus 17:14; Deuteronomy 25:19.
the law of *mamzerut*, which would keep the child of an illicit relationship outside the community.\(^36\)

In the later Biblical writings the idea of protecting innocent children from the sins of their parents is emphasized. In the words of Ezekiel (18: 1-4; 18-19):

“The word of the Lord came to me: What do you mean by quoting this proverb upon the soil of Israel, “Parents eat sour grapes and their children’s teeth are blunted”\(^37\)? As I live- declares the Lord God- this proverb shall no longer be current among you in Israel. Consider all lives are Mine; the life of the parent and the life of the child are both Mine. The person who sins, only he shall die…. To be sure, his father, because he practiced fraud, robbed his brother, and acted wickedly among his kin, did die for his iniquity; and now you ask, “Why has not the son shared the burden of his father’s guilt?” But the son has done what is right and just, and has carefully kept all My laws: he shall live!

In *Ketuvim* we find a softening of the literal reading of the prohibition of future generations of Moab marrying an Israelite.\(^38\) Ruth the Moabitess marries Boaz, an Israelite.\(^39\) Even more remarkable, we read in the postscript to Ruth that her husband’s ancestor Peretz was born from the union of Judah and Tamar. Peretz is ostensibly a *mamzer*, because Tamar was betrothed to Judah’s third son, Shelah, according to the mandate of levirate marriage. Tamar’s betrothed status explains Judah’s initial outraged

\(^{36}\) Deuteronomy 23:3.  
\(^{37}\) This folk expression is also condemned in Jeremiah 31:29 and Ezekiel 18:2.  
\(^{38}\) Deuteronomy 23:4-8; Nehemiah 13:1.  
\(^{39}\) The Mishnah and Talmud parse the Torah prohibition as a restriction only on the marriage of male Moabites- see *Yevamot* 76b-77a.
response on hearing of Tamar’s pregnancy. He condemned her to death by burning. Nonetheless, not only are the offsprings of Peretz, and Tamar and Boaz, not barred from the people of Israel, among their descendants is King David, and his descendant is none other than the Messiah!”,

Protecting children from suffering due to no fault of their own, seems to conflict with the thrice repeated Biblical statement that God remembers the sins of fathers for three or four generations. Once again, rabbis in the Talmud, midrash, and many classic commentators rejected the literal reading of the verses and, like Ezekiel, stated that God only punishes children if they acted wrongfully themselves, thereby imitating their sinful parents.

The rule of mamzerut conflicts with the evolving moral challenge that each person is to be punished for his or her own acts. In the words of Louis Jacobs, "even though the law does not necessarily see it as a penalty the fact remains that it is a disability of the most serious nature, intolerable within a legal system that prides itself on its passion for justice." There is an additional moral problem with mamzerut as understood by the rabbis. It deprecates the status of converts by permitting a mamzer to marry a convert, but not a native born Jew. This conflicts with the moral value stated in

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41 Ruth 4: 18-22.
42 Exodus 20:5, 34:7; Numbers 14: 18.
43 Sanhedrin 27b.
44 Mekhilta BaChodesh 6: “This only applies to those sons who themselves are wicked like their fathers.” Also see Tosefta Yoma 5:13 on Exodus 34:7, ed. Zuckermandel: “A person sins once, twice, three times and is forgiven, as it says, “forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin”- three times, but thereafter God no longer remits punishment.”
45 Rashi, Sforno, and Ramban.
46 Jacobs at 265.
47 Kiddushin 73a and see Rashi there; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah 15:7; Shulkhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:22.
the Talmud that a person is not to be reminded that they are a convert, lest it embarrass them (ρδπ ,τβντ).\textsuperscript{48}

In recent years, the numbers of people who qualify as \textit{mamzerim} have proliferated. In America there are many who are married by a rabbi, receive a civil divorce but no \textit{get}, and remarry a Jew—either with a Justice of the Peace or a Reform or Reconstructionist rabbi. The children of the subsequent marriage are technically \textit{mamzerim}, although rarely was it the intent of the parents to knowingly violate the religious law.

In response to the \textit{halakhic} problem of many Jews remarrying without a \textit{get}, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein ruled that non-Orthodox weddings were not binding.\textsuperscript{49} This solved the \textit{mamzerut} question for the Orthodox. It only underscores our problem as a Conservative movement. We recognize as religiously binding the marriages between Jews when performed according to \textit{halakhic} standards regardless of our colleagues denomination. When those marriages end in civil divorce and no \textit{get} is issued, a subsequent marriage poses the problem of \textit{mamzerut}.

In light of the State of Israel’s ingathering of Jews, there is an increased array of potential \textit{mamzerim}. Rabbi Seymour Siegel was prescient when he wrote close to twenty years ago:

The imposition of this norm causes untold difficulties, especially in the absorption of groups of Jews who have been removed from the main body of Israel, such as [India’s] \textit{Bene}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Bava Metziah} 58b.
\textsuperscript{49} (1970/ζν, ;σ εφι ινης οδ εκφ άρζηα γε τ έσαν ,υρδτ ρπζ άργντπρ ηαυηήεξ ηαηηαφήηηή έσαν Although this teshuvah is written about the \textit{halakhically} inoperative quality of Reform weddings, Orthodox rabbis have also applied the holding to Conservative rabbis, too.
Israel and the [Ethiopian] Falashas. As these groups have not been instructed in the specifics of religious divorce laws, they are presumed to include mamzerim within their numbers. The problem of mamzerut is bound to be exacerbated when large scale immigration occurs from the communist-bloc countries. Many women, it is to be assumed, married without religious divorces and therefore technically gave birth to mamzerim.\(^{50}\)

Consequently, in the words of Rabbi Louis Jacobs, "There is a frightening proliferation of technical mamzerim on a scale that is completely unknown or even imagined in the classical period of the Halakhah. In addition there is the creation of a caste of untouchables, which further divide the Jewish community."\(^{51}\) The risks are more than theoretical. The following are two cases from recent decades.

**The Oshry Case.**

Rabbi Ephraim Oshry, a leading posek on the Holocaust and its aftermath, records in his collection of responsa the following case.\(^{52}\) A young rabbi came to him for halakhic guidance. The young man’s mother had married before the Holocaust. Her husband was taken away by the Nazis and did not return after the war. She remarried and had a son, who became a rabbi. Decades after the war the woman’s first husband found “his wife.” He was outraged that she had remarried and in anger, he publicized that her

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\(^{51}\) Jacobs at 271.

son, the rabbi, was a *mamzer*. The son, who lived in Australia and was married with several children, wrote the famous *posek* for guidance.

Rabbi Oshry examined the responsa literature and with a confession of pain concluded that the young man was unfortunately a *mamzer*. He advised that the man should cease to be a rabbi so as not to profane the Divine Name”(*יהוה*) and implied that as a *mamzer*, he should not be married to a Jewess.

**Goren’s Langer Case.**

The most publicized case of *mamzerut* in recent decades was the predicament of the Langer children. The background was as follows. In August 1951 Avraham Borokovsky, a convert, appeared with his wife Chava Borokovsky-Langer, before a *beit din* in Tel Aviv and applied for a religious divorce. Although the couple had lived in Israel for close to twenty years, they had not lived together for many years. The religious court learned that in the intervening years Chava had married a second man, Otto Langer, and had done so by lying about her marriage status to the rabbi who performed the second marriage. Chava and Otto Langer had two children, Chanoch and Miriam. The *beit din* of Tel Aviv granted Avraham and Chava Borkovsky a divorce in November 1955 and declared that Chanoch and Miriam Langer were *mamzerim*.

In May 1966 Chanoch Langer applied to marry, which began a series of hearings and remands. The *Beit Din of Petach Tikvah* in 1967 held that Chanoch’s status as a *mamzer* remained unchanged and he could not marry his Jewish fiancee. The Supreme Religious Court affirmed the decree in 1970. The case received a great deal of coverage in the Israeli and Jewish press. It was decried as a travesty of justice that a

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native Israeli, a man who had a bar mitzvah and had served in the Israeli army, should be prohibited from marrying a Jew, because of the misdeed of his mother.

On November 19, 1972, the then chief Ashkenazi rabbi, Shlomo Goren, issued a ruling in his own name and in the name of eight other rabbis, whose names he refused to reveal, permitting the Langers to marry. He justified his reversal of the earlier courts on the basis of new evidence that Avraham Borokovsky was an insincere convert, which meant that his Jewish marriage was nullified ab initio and hence the children were in no way tainted.

Jewish legal authorities protested Goren’s finding because of his violation of normal halakhic procedure. Among the irregularities were the following:

- Goren failed to give Borokovsky the opportunity to refute the charge that he had renounced his conversion to Judaism by having reverted to Christianity. In fact, there was much evidence that he had conducted himself as a practicing Jew.
- When there is "new evidence" the normal procedure is to remand the case to the original beit din, which was not done here.
- Goren refused to reveal the names of the other rabbis who issued the decree removing the stigma of mamzerut from the Langer children.

The Langer case reveals that there are many rabbis who feel bound by the law of mamzerut and are willing to enforce it. Regrettably, the court system in Israel continues to keep lists of people who are labeled mamzerim. Moshe Zemer, a prominent Israeli legal scholar writes: "the Israel religious councils and official rabbinate use a central computer bank to trace the descendants of persons accused of alleged adultery or
incest a generation ago or more.” There are many Jews in our day who are technically mamzerim and for some there are real consequences. Before discussing how this injustice can be corrected let us look at the reasons offered for the law and the attempts to ameliorate its impact.

### The Rationales of Mamzerut.

There are two reasons offered for the law of mamzerut: deterrence against illicit sex and the need to maintain the purity of Israel.

#### 1. Deterrence Against Promiscuity.

Jewish tradition emphasizes the sanctity of the marriage bond. Adultery is the seventh of the Ten Commandments and the penalty for violation of this command is death. The following midrash emphasizes that marital faithfulness preserved the Israelites:

"A closed garden:" Rabbi Pineas said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba that because Israel protected themselves in Egypt from sexual immorality they were redeemed from Egypt...because there was none among them who was promiscuous except, you should know, one woman, and Scripture publicized her, that is, "Shlomit

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55 Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17.
56 Leviticus 20:10.
57 Song of Songs 4:12.
bat Dibry of the tribe of Dan”... “bat Dibry”- R. Isaac said that she brought pestilence (ρχσ) on her son.

Two things are learned of the rabbis’ perception of the generation who received Torah: adultery was rare, and when it occurred there were severe consequences for the children. The threat of punishment on children was viewed as a powerful and successful deterrent against sexual violations. In a later generation, Maimonides (Spain-Egypt, 1135-1204) wrote:

In order to deter people from illicit unions, a bastard is forbidden to marry a daughter of Israel; so that the adulterous man and adulterous woman should know that by committing their act they attach to their descendants a stigma that can never be effaced.

In the times of the Torah, the Talmudic Period, and even the Middle Ages, mamzerut may have served as a check against improper sexual relations. In those times people lived in a closed society, and the only form of marriage was religious. In our open society, mamzerut is no longer a deterrent.

Although the original intent of mamzerut may have been to limit adultery, the rabbis, acting out of sympathy for the innocent victims, almost eliminated its application to infidelity. The Talmud says that a child of a married woman, whose husband was absent during the gestation, is presumed to be the lawful father. Toward that end, Rabbi Tosfaah, a seventh generation Babylonian Amora, held that a woman,

58 Leviticus 24:10.
59 VaYikra Rabbah 32:5; also see Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 1:4; Sifra, Kedoshim, 90d; Yevamot 37b.
61 Sotah 27a.
whose husband was away on travel, was able to carry a fetus for a full twelve months.\(^{62}\)

This ruling, a clear violation of medical experience, was maintained by later codes, including Maimonides’ *Mishneh Torah*.\(^{63}\)

An accuser had the burden of proof of *mamzerut*,\(^{64}\) which required two witnesses to substantiate the charge. Even if adultery was demonstrated, the presumption remained that the lawful husband had conceived the child. On the general principle that a person’s confession of his or her turpitude is not admissible as legal testimony the wife and mother could not by her assertion alone classify her child as a *mamzer*. It was and is the rare case of a husband willing and able to demonstrate with witnesses that his wife’s offspring are not his own. In our time the mother’s husband might even demonstrate the absence of paternity for purposes of *mamzerut* by DNA testing, a possibility that has not yet been addressed in the responsa literature.

In our day, *mamzerim* are overwhelmingly created as a result of Jewish ignorance or apathy and not promiscuity. *Mamzerim* are technically produced when a woman has children with a subsequent husband having failed to obtain a *get* after her first marriage. In contrast to an earlier day, couples in our time are married civilly by a Justice of the Peace or by Rabbis who are self-defined as non-*halakhic*. Rather than flaunting immorality such couples are making a commitment to monogamy. If the rationale of

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\(^{62}\) *Yevamot* 80b.

\(^{63}\) *Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah* 15:19- Maimonides adds that the period is not longer than twelve months. *Helakhot Gedolot* does not accept the twelve month limitation. The *Shulhan Arukh* (EH 4:14) records both the twelve month limitation and its rejection and holds that since the authorities differ, a child born more than twelve months after the husband’s departure from his wife is considered a “doubtful *mamzer*.” Louis Jacobs cites a mystical, magical explanation for how a woman could get pregnant with her husband’s child during her husband’s apparent absence. The medieval explanation is that the man could have returned swiftly and secretly through the use of the “divine name.” Louis Jacobs 1984 at 263-264, citing Rosh to *Kiddushin*, beginning of chapter four and *Tosaphot* to *Kiddushin* 73a, c.v. *mai ikka*.

\(^{64}\) *Kiddushin* 76b, also see *Bava Kamma* 35b.
mamzerut was to prevent promiscuity, it no longer does so and, if anything, simply
punishes the children of the ignorant who are committed to marriage.

2. Communal Purity.

Communal purity is not mentioned in the Talmud as a justification for
mamzerut, but it is advanced among medieval and even contemporary commentators. The
clearest expression is found in Sefer ha-Hinukh (anonymous, 16th century):

The very conception of the mamzer is exceedingly evil, having
been brought about in impurity [πνψχ], abominable intention and
counsel of sin and there is not doubt that the nature of the parent is
concealed in the child [γχψ υπιμ χτπ γχψ ηφ]. Consequently,
God, in His love, has kept the holy people away from him [the
mamzer] just as He has separated us and kept us far away from all
that is evil.65

Ben Zion Uziel, a prominent, contemporary Israeli rabbi, asserts that the concept of
communal purity is the underpinning of mamzerut. He writes, "a mamzer’s base status

65 Sefer HaHinukh, Mitzvah 560.
should not be seen as a punishment for the sin of his parents, but is rather quasi-physical."\(^{66}\)

Leading medieval rabbis express a link between *mamzerut* and communal purity. Although Maimonides (Spain-Egypt 1135-1204) explains the reason for *mamzerut* as deterrence, he also writes, "the noble people of Israel has to be protected from any adulteration of its purity."\(^{67}\) Nahmanides (Spain-Israel, 1194-1270) develops this idea:

The Jew attaches great importance to the strength of the family unit. It is inconceivable to him that an element which might reduce the strength of this valuable asset be admitted into the family. No chances must be taken because too much is at stake.\(^{68}\)

"Communal purity" rings false in our day. We are not a "pure people." Although Jews may share a greater likelihood of certain genes, such as Tay-Sachs, there is no gene unique to Jews. In regard to breeding, we do not possess a record of pedigree, referred to in some classical sources as *megillat yehusin*. In fact, *mamzerim* have mixed into the community for generations. Already the Talmud records, "a family that has assimilated [into the community] may remain assimilated."\(^{69}\) Similarly, Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (Palestine, 40-120 CE), who is normally known for his stringency, states in the Talmud that if he were asked to rule on the genealogy of a third generation female *mamzer*, he would declare her pure.\(^{70}\) The principle of refraining from identifying

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66 *Mishpetey Uziel*, 4 Even ha-Ezer, no. 3.
68 Nahmanides’ commentary to Deuteronomy 23:3.
69 *Kiddushin* 71a-b.

70 *Yevamot* 78b. A justification for not examining a person’s lineage for *mamzerut* was the claim in the *Jerusalem Talmud* that a *mamzer* does not live for more than thirty days, which meant that *mamzerim* were not available for marriage. A variation of this assertion is debated in the *Babylonian Talmud*, which distinguished between a "completely unknown" *mamzer*, who some say does not survive at all, and a
mamzerim in the community was codified and explained by Moses Isserles’ (Poland, d.1572) in his gloss to the Shulkhan Arukh:

It is forbidden to reveal the blemish of a family that is not public knowledge. If the family has been assimilated, it should be left with its presumption of validity, for all families are valid in the Messianic age.71

In sum, we as a people are mixed with mamzerim. We cannot justify punishing people for the sins of their parents because of the false assertion of purity. Due to the hardship imposed by the label mamzer, rabbis of previous generations sought to narrow the category.

Partial Solutions:

The following are a variety of proposed solutions to mamzerut, each of which is fundamentally incomplete. Implicit in all these attempts is the desire to remove the stigma of mamzerut. The survey demonstrates that past generations were stymied by the challenge of changing this Biblical law.

1. Purification- Rabbi Tarfon’s Approach.

The Talmud offers a legal loophole to give at least a male mamzer’s children entry back into community:

Rabbi Tarfon says that male mamzerim can be purified.

How? A mamzer marries a gentile slave woman (מফתא) and the

71 Shulkhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 2:5.
child born of this union will thus have the status of a slave. Let him then free him \((\upsilon\rho\rho\alpha\) and his son will have the status of a free Jew \((\tau\rho\nu\varphi\iota\chi\)\. Rabbi Eliezer says that he will have the status of a slave who is a \textit{mamzer}.\(^{72}\)

Both Talmuds and the Codes hold according to Rabbi Tarfon.\(^{73}\) Simultaneously, there is a debate in the Talmud whether such a marriage is permitted at the outset \((\pi\kappa\eta\varphi,\nu\) or only after the fact \((\sigma\chi\gamma\sigma\chi\)\. Maimonides rules that such marriages should be permitted at the outset, because of the need to rectify the status of the children.\(^{74}\)

Whether Rabbi Tarfon’s solution is applicable in our own day is largely a theoretical question, because we live in a monogamous society and we don’t have a legal category of concubines. In a Yeshiva law-review-like-article written in 1994, Rabbi David Katz examines the contemporary value of Rabbi Tarfon’s proposal as a solution to \textit{mamzerut}.\(^{75}\) Katz ruled out intermarriage as a Jewish option and focused instead on whether a woman in our day could become a concubine \((\pi\varphi\pi\alpha\)\. After thirty-one pages of analysis, he concluded that it is "a tenuous option for our day." The major obstacle, he said, was that our society does not permit any forms of slavery.\(^{76}\) As Conservative Jews we also reject the category of concubine relationships and the demotion of a woman to such a lower status.

\(^{72}\text{Kiddushin 3:13.}\)

\(^{73}\text{Kiddushin 67a and Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3.15/64d/bottom, which quotes Rabbi Yehudah in the name of Shmuel holding that the law is according to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. Also see, Rashi on Kiddushin 67a; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Issurei Bi’ah 15:3; Tur and Beit Yosef, Even ha-Ezer 4; Shulkhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 4:20.}\)

\(^{74}\text{Mishneh Torah, Hilkhut Issurei Be’ah 15:4; also see Karo’s Shulkhan Arukh 4:20.}\)


\(^{76}\text{Moreover, for a Jew to marry a slave he must first sell himself into slavery.}\)
Rabbi Tarfon’s "solution” fails to resolve the *mamzerut* dilemma for other reason, too. Tarfon’s recommendation only purifies the offspring of a *mamzer* (man) and not a *mamzeret* (woman). He encourages a man to marry a non-Jew, because the children of a non-Jewish woman are non-Jews, who may then convert and be considered as Jews, untainted by their father’s status. This "remedy” fails for a *mamzeret*, because her child is Jewish and therefore a *mamzer*. In addition, his approach would restrict Jews to non-Jews, a particularly troublesome alternative for our day when the greatest challenge to the Jewish community is intermarriage.

2. Nullification by the Maharsham’s Legal Loophole.

There is another legal loophole that in theory enables nullification of marriages that were performed legally, which would provide a possible solution for a child of an illegitimate second marriage. This theoretical construct begins with a husband’s right, as described in the Talmud,\textsuperscript{77} to appoint a proxy to deliver a *get*. The husband would remain married if he annulled the proxy at any point prior to the delivery of the *get*. Rabban Gamliel feared that the proxy might unknowingly give an invalid *get* to an unsuspecting woman, which could lead to the proliferation of *mamzerim*. Consequently, he prohibited a man from canceling the proxy unless the proxy was physically present. To enforce Rabban Gamliel’s decree, the Talmud held that a *beit din* could annul a marriage retroactively if the husband cancelled the proxy prior to the delivery of the *get*. The Tosaphot noted that Rabban Gamliel’s decree could in theory legitimize acts of adultery, with the cooperation of the husband, thereby exempting an adulterer and adulteress from punishment.

\textsuperscript{77} *Gittin* 32a.
The Maharsham, Rabbi Shalom Mordecai Schwadron (Galicia, 1835-1911) quotes the Tosaphot in response to a question on *mamzerut*. The case was as follows: A man from Odessa went abroad. After twelve years and no communication with his wife, his family notified her that her husband was dead. Her brother-in-law performed *halitzah* and she later remarried with permission of the *beit din*. During her pregnancy she received word that her first husband was still alive and that he had lent his passport to another man who had died and was mistakenly identified as her husband.

The rabbi of Odessa asked the Maharsham for a determination of the fate of the woman and her child. The Maharsham concluded that she needed a divorce from both her husbands and that her child was a *mamzer*. In the Maharsham’s discussion he noted a theoretical solution to remedy the status of the child. The first husband could have divorced his wife with a proxy and then cancelled the proxy privately, which would have given the *beit din* grounds to annul the first marriage. Unfortunately, the Maharsham conceded that his elegant solution of rectifying the child’s status was inapplicable because the first husband had already divorced his wife.

Justice Moshe Silberg proposed using the power of annulment as a solution to *mamzerut*. Rabbi David Novak supports Silberg’s proposal as a remedy when the status of the child cannot be ignored. Novak writes:

The main argument against this solution, as we saw before, was that the Tosafists feared it would lead to sexual immorality since any violated marriage could be annulled.

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retroactively. However, the answer to this objection today is threefold: (1) in today’s atmosphere of unprecedented ignorance and apathy among the majority of the Jewish people, fear of the consequence of mamzerut is no longer operative in their sexual decision making; (2) improperly initiated second marriages, which can easily be performed under either secular or non-halakhic Jewish auspices, are not considered "fornication" by the majority of the Jewish people; (3) any situation which could lead a segment of the Jewish people to believe that intermarriage is the only solution to their personal and familial dilemma must be rectified since intermarriage and its attendant assimilation pose today’s greatest threat to the survival of both the Jewish people and Judaism. As the Mishnah noted in a famous passage, changes in the law are called for when worse results will emerge from staying with the status quo, "'It is time to act for the Lord; they have violated your Torah.' (Psalms 119:126). R. Nathan said, 80 'violate the Torah because it is time to act for the Lord!'"81

Although Novak makes a strong case for taking dramatic action in response to mamzerut, his annulment approach fails as a general solution, for the following reasons:

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80 Mishnah Berakhot 9:5.
81 Novak 1985 at 28.
• If a child was born of an adulterous relationship prior to the retroactive annulment of the marriage the children are *mamzerim*.82
• It would require the full cooperation of the first husband, which is hard to count on.
• If a woman obtained a *get* from her husband after the birth of the illicit child, the husband cannot give her a second *get*, as in Maharsham’s actual case.
• The annulment process requires the cooperation of the wife, a cooperation that we cannot always rely on.

Beyond theoretical problems there is the ethical rub. Novak acknowledges that even with annulment the children would remain with an informal social stigma as being children of *de jure* "fornication,” which he adds, would "prevent some others from marrying them.”83 In sum, Novak’s annulment solution may not cover all cases, is unwieldy in many cases, and leaves the child with a "social stigma.” Novak acknowledges that until now the annulment approach was only theoretical because of fear of abuse, but is worth implementing due to the exigency of the situation. Yet, Novak stops short of using the same legal construct of "it is time to act for the Lord” to uproot the concept of *mamzerut*. He refrains from this more complete change because he writes, "The authority of any legal system cannot tolerate picking and choosing which institutions are to be upheld and which are to be dropped.”84

3. Silberg’s Civil Marriage Solution.

82 Nahmanides, *Shitah Mekubezet*, and Meiri to *Ketubot* 3a, cited in Bleich 1977 at 164.
83 Novak 1985 at 28.
84 Ibid. at 27.
Professor Moshe Silberg, formerly a justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, advocates a system of civil marriages for mamzerim.\(^{85}\) He does so in response to a close reading of Maimonides. Silberg points out that Maimonides in the \textit{Mishneh Torah} only prohibits the marriage of a \textit{mamzer} and a Jew,\(^{86}\) which Silberg asserts leaves open the possibility of concubines or civil marriage.

Rabbi Judah Dick’s writes that Silberg’s analysis of Maimonides is mistaken.\(^{87}\) Although Maimonides is silent on concubines in the paragraph on \textit{mamzerut}, Dick writes, Maimonides is explicit on limiting concubines to Kings\(^{88}\) and prohibiting sex outside of marriage.\(^{89}\) Even if Silberg’s reading of Maimonides is correct, his solution permits a “marriage,” but the offspring are \textit{mamzerim}. Moreover, a "solution” which would deny a Jew a traditional marriage under the \textit{huppah} and would perpetuate the exclusion of the \textit{mamzer} from normal Jewish life is not a solution.


The most common approach to "solving a \textit{mamzerut}” case is to find a way to nullify the first marriage on a case-by-case basis. This is precisely what Rabbi Goren did in the Langer case by his holding that the first husband was not Jewish, due to later acts which demonstrated fraud at the time of “conversion,” and hence no Jewish marriage had taken place. On a broader level, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein addressed the widespread, contemporary problem of \textit{mamzerut} by holding that the weddings of nonOrthodox rabbis

\(^{86}\) Maimonides, \textit{Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah} 15:2.
\(^{87}\) See Judah Dick in \textit{HaPardeš (Hebrew), Tishri 5732}, cited in Bleich 1977 at 160-161.
\(^{88}\) \textit{Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah} 15:2; Louis Jacobs in “The Problem of the Mamzer,” [271-272] notes that Silberg would respond to critics that Maimonides would allow non-royalty to have sexual relations with a concubine. But, Jacobs counters, even so, it would not help a \textit{mamzer} who is prohibited by Maimonides from a Jewish concubine.
\(^{89}\) \textit{Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Ishut} 1:1.
were invalid. Since the nonOrthodox marriages were not binding, there was no need for a get and children of the marriages were untainted.

Nullification does not work for Conservative rabbis unless there is an actual defect in the original marriage. It is inadequate as a general approach, because not all marriages are performed improperly. Unlike Rabbi Feinstein, we accept the marriages conducted by Reform and Reconstructionist colleagues who have complied with Halakhic standards.

5. Circumvention through Narrow Rules of Evidence.

Many post-Talmudic rabbis circumvented mamzerut through applying narrow rules of evidence. Rabbi Louis Jacobs provides the following examples:91

*When a mother confessed that her son was not her husband’s, Benjamin Zeev of Arta (sixteenth century) did not accept the confession;92

*Rabbi Moses Sofer (eighteenth century) would not conclude that a child born years after a man had left his wife was a mamzer.93

*Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (twentieth century) ruled that a mother is not believed when she declares that she had been previously married and that her son from her second husband is a mamzer.94

Each of these examples reveals a desire to avoid the label of mamzerut and is explained by the rules of evidence as presented in the Shulkhan Arukh. Regarding the case of Benjamin Zeev of Arta, a mother’s confession is not acceptable testimony to

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91 Jacobs 1984 at 270.
92 Responsa, Binynamin Ze’ev, vol. 1, Even ha-Ezer, no. 136.
93 Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer, no. 10.
impugn the status of her son.\textsuperscript{95} Moshe Isserles explains in his gloss that for a married woman a presumption exists that any offspring are those of her husband. In the matter before Rabbi Moses Sofer, the rabbi’s were prepared to engage in medical (and mystical) fictions to explain how a legitimate child could have been conceived despite the apparent absence of the husband. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein could rely on the Talmudic principle that a person should not be believed to impugn him or herself (גארו ונמיי ונה##_גא##ו##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא##גא5). Yet, there are other evidentiary circumstances that are not reflected in these cases, where statements provide \textit{prima facie} proof of \textit{mamzerut} according to the \textit{Shulkhan Arukh}. If a man said, "this is not my fetus or my son, he is believed."\textsuperscript{96} If a person says, "I am a \textit{mamzer}," his testimony is accepted and his son is also classified as a \textit{mamzer}.\textsuperscript{97} The man is believed, because his confession does not impugn his own guilt. He is addressing the conduct of his wife or his parents and his claim is accepted. This was precisely the predicament that Rabbi Oshry faced, a man said that his wife’s son was a \textit{mamzer}, and the rules of evidence made that a compelling and binding claim on the judge. Hence, there are limits to a judge’s ability to circumvent \textit{mamzerut} through evidentiary rules alone.

\textbf{6. Implicitly Ignoring Mamzerut.}

There was a consistent effort in the past to narrow the application of \textit{mamzerut} by restricting the types of evidence that were admissible to prove adultery.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Even ha-Ezer} 4:29. Moshe Isserles adds that although there is a presumption that a married woman’s offspring are those of her legal husband, there are those who hold that the presumption does not hold for an engaged woman (נ_##ח##_ד#/)

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Even ha-Ezer} 4:29.

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Even ha-Ezer} 4:30.
Many rabbis went even a step further and ignored evidence of *mamzerut*. In the words of Rabbi Louis Jacobs:

> Since the majority of Jews who wish to marry are not *mamzerim* the rule of probability can and should be relied upon.

There are even rumors, quite persistent, that in prewar days some Orthodox Rabbis would drop broad hints to known *mamzerim* that they should emigrate to a community where they were not known and marry there....  

Nevertheless, a very good case can be made out for at least avoiding any investigation the purpose of which is to uncover the identity of *mamzerim*. This is certainly the norm among the Orthodox in most parts of the United States where cases of *mamzerut* rarely occur because the Orthodox rabbis are intentionally perfunctory in their investigation.  

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, for instance, it is remarkable how few cases of *mamzerut* arose. The Langer and Oshry cases are exceptions that prove the rule. The rabbis in Israel and America actively ignored the issues of *mamzerut*, which we may surmise occurred in many cases in the shadow of those horrific years.

We too may choose to ignore the category of *mamzerut*, but *Halakhic* integrity demands that we justify our action. We need to give guidance to colleagues and congregants on this vexing problem when it arises. A clear statement as a *Halakhic*

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98 A precedent for rabbis encouraging suspected *mamzerim* to go where they are not recognized is in *Yevamot* 45a, in which both Rav Yehudah and Rava tell men to go where they are unknown. But, in those cases, as Rashi points out, the respective rabbis did not agree with the definition of *mamzerut* that was applied to the men, namely that a *mamzer* was the product of relations between an idolator or slave and a Jewish woman.

99 Jacobs 1984 at 275,
movement is all the more urgent in the context of rabbis in Israel who keep the category of *mamzerut* alive, including the maintenance of computer records on *mamzerut* suspects. We need to address *mamzerut* precisely because it raises the question whether we will enforce a Torah law that strikes us as unconscionable in light of other Torah values. *Mamzerut* is a real problem for which only incomplete answers have been offered. In the words of Professor Ze’ev Falk, former Rector of the Seminary’s Beit Midrash:

Injustice was felt, but there was not enough courage to change the law. Although doubts had been raised long ago as to the purity of pedigree of most people, the rules of impediments were nevertheless applied against those who were unfortunate enough to be known as *mamzerim*.100

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**Morality and Halakhah.**

Although *mamzerut* is morally reprehensible it has remained operative in Jewish law, because of systemic fears. The fear is that to make a change on moral grounds is to impugn God, which would unravel the system. Dr. David Weiss Halivni, Professor of Talmud at Columbia University, has stated that contemporary morality is not the basis for change in *halakhah*. In his article, “Can a Religious Law be Immoral” Weiss wrote:

...even when the Rabbis altered a law, they never abrogated it. They retained the integrity of the law. By integrity I

mean partial applicability. They did not totally eliminate the law. It still remained valid and pertinent to an extreme and rare situation. That was necessary in order not to impugn the Lawgiver with a lack of moral sensitivity which may undermine not only this law, but laws in general. Once one has formulated, as in the case of bastardy, \( \nu \omicron \rho \zeta \nu \nu \), the need for changing the law because of moral exigency, any subsequent change will be interpreted as an admission that initially there was no moral sensitivity, imputing to the Lawgiver a defective moral awareness. The Rabbis instinctively shied away from such a formulation.\(^\text{101}\)

When Rabbi David Novak examined the problem of the mamzer, he acknowledged a moral problem, but only looked for a case-by-case solution. Maharsham’s annulment strategy, which Novak presented as the best solution, fails to resolve all mamzerut cases. Novak hesitated to change the law on explicitly moral grounds, because of the fear that it might lead to the unravelling of Halakhah. In his words: "...once it is posited that a Toraitic institution does not exist one cannot talk about a normative process at all anymore. The authority of any legal system cannot tolerate picking and choosing which institutions are to be held and which are to be dropped."\(^\text{102}\)

It is true that the rabbis in the past did not explicitly use morality as the basis for change or interpretation of a law. In explaining the Torah’s statement "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,"\(^\text{103}\) for example, the rabbis of the Talmud offer ten separate

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hermeneutic proofs that the verse calls for compensation and not mutilation. Each of the proofs is indirect and tenuous, which explains why so many "proofs" are offered. Underlying the ingenious arguments is an implicit matter of conscience regarding the taking of body parts. In the words of Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, “The reference to the overruling ethical principle is not always explicit in halakhic decisions. It is, however, obvious that it plays a decisive role in the final conclusion.”

A reliance on hermeneutic rules of interpretation and legal loopholes emerges from the view that Torah embodies an all encompassing, eternal wisdom. There is a price paid, however, for only looking inwardly for the justification of change. The hermeneutic rules may fail to provide a comprehensive solution, as in the case of mamzerut. Preserving the system may begin to look more important than acting justly and halakhah may begin to look more like a chess game than a system of religious striving. In the words of Rabbi Gordon Tucker: “Halakhah is a theological legal system. Separating law from moral principle in such a system, as positivists would be wont to do, is to separate moral principles from God, and that is theologically untenable.”

While Conservative Judaism would affirm that the Torah is Divine in its origin, the revelation at Sinai is seen as the beginning of a relationship and not the final word. Interpretation is understood as our communal attempt to understand the will of a compassionate Divine partner. As we mature we are able to understand God’s will for us more clearly. If a law appears unconscionable, we would say that the shortcoming is either our previous understanding or that circumstances have so changed that the rule no longer meets its intended result. In the words of Rabbi Elliot Dorff:

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104 Bava Kamma 82b-84a.
The Orthodox would not consider modern ethical sensitivities as sufficient grounds to change the law: for them, the law as it has been formulated over the centuries must be binding. The Conservative Movement maintains that the purpose of the law in the first place is largely to concretize moral values, and so the specific form of the law can and should be changed if it is not effectively doing that. In other words, the aggadah should control the halakhah.\textsuperscript{107}

When asked if a law of the Torah can be immoral we would respond, no! It is precisely because we see God as the source of morality that we cannot accept that a Jewish law would lead us away from morality. In that light, we say in our collective statement of principles, \textit{Emet v’Emunah}:

In some cases changes are necessary to prevent or remove injustice, while in others they constitute a positive program to enhance the quality of Jewish life by elevating its moral standards or deepening its piety…. We affirm that the halakhic process has striven to embody the highest moral principles.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Mamzerut} poses a moral problem. It punishes an innocent child for the sins of his or her parent. We are concerned for the plight of innocent children because of

\textsuperscript{107} Elliot Dorff, \textit{Conservative Judaism: Our Ancestors to our Descendants} (NY: United Synagogue, 1977; revised 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, 1996), p. 160 of 1\textsuperscript{st} edition. The same point is made in Elliot Dorff’s “The Interaction of Jewish Law with Morality,” \textit{Judaism} (vol. 38, no. 3, Summer 1989), pp. 455-466; Gordon Tucker, “God, the Good, and Halakhah,” \textit{Judaism} (vol. 38, no. 3, Summer 1989), pp. 365-376; Bradley Shavit Artson, “Halakhah and Ethics: The Holy and the Good,” \textit{Conservative Judaism} (vol. 46, no. 3, Spring 1994), pp. 70-88; Seymour Siegel, “Ethics and Halakhah,” \textit{Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law} (NY: RA, 1977), in which the author writes: “the law must be revised in light of the ethical values…. We have a responsibility toward the historic norms which we have inherited, but this responsibility does not extend so far that we must accept them when they result in unethical situations.” (p.128)

the teachings of *Tanakh* and our rabbinic predecessors. Our generation is part of a chain that expresses grave concern over implementing the rule of *mamzerut*. Daniel the Tailor, in a relatively late Midrash, described God shedding tears for the *mamzer* and promising a cleansing in the Messianic era. The rabbis narrowed the rules of evidence and posited medical absurdities. Many solutions were offered, but none sufficiently narrowed the category of *mamzerut*.

We remain with *halakhic* dilemmas. When we know that a congregant obtained a civil divorce and did not obtain a *get* and the child of the second marriage stands before us ready to get married, what do we do? When we are confronted with a father who says, this child is not mine!, what do we do? Do we hold that these children are *mamzerim* and refuse to marry them? We are left with the challenge posited by Rabbi Seymour Siegel: "Let us do now what the Kadosh barukh Hu is to do in the future."

To choose not to implement *mamzerut* requires humility, both in deference to Torah and to the generations of rabbis who struggled with the moral implications of *mamzerut*. And yet, *mamzerut* challenges us to speak with courage and clarity about how Judaism unfolds and how laws do change. *Mamzerut* is an opportunity to make explicit what was until now implicit, morality is at the center of the *Halakhic* process.

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**Toolbox of Halakhic Change.**

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Throughout the generations, the implementation of the Torah’s commands has evolved. There are many examples and the following provides a sampling:

- *Leviticus* omits explicit permission for a *kohen* to bury his wife,\(^{110}\) which the rabbis read into the text as a requirement.\(^{111}\)

- *Numbers* offers an actual case of a gatherer of sticks on Shabbat who was publicly stoned for the offense.\(^{112}\) There are no anecdotes of such a severe penalty for Shabbat violation in the Talmud.\(^{113}\)

- *Deuteronomy* states that one cannot exempt oneself from a vow,\(^{114}\) yet the rabbis allow for rabbinic annulment of unwise vows.\(^{115}\)

- Despite the strong language compelling the death penalty for murder,\(^{116}\) the rabbis avoided it through crafting high procedural hurdles, such as: confessions were inadmissible; the defendant needed a warning prior to the commission of the crime; and two trustworthy eye-witnesses were required.\(^{117}\)

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\(^{110}\) Leviticus 21:3 states regarding death and the priest: “none shall defile himself for any [dead] person among his kin, except for the relatives that are closer to him: his mother, his father, his son, his daughter, and his brother, and also for his virgin sister….” Rabbi ben Meir, a 12th century explicator of the literal meaning (ψαρι) commented: “No husband from among the kinship [of the priesthood] may defile himself for his wife.”

\(^{111}\) The Sifra comments that “except for the relatives that are closer to him” refers to his wife, a position that is also held by Rashi and Abraham ibn Ezra. This idea is codified in Maimonides’ *Mishnah Torah*: “As regards the wife of the priest, one must render himself impure, even against his will ….The Scribes gave her the status of a ‘dead person’ who he is commanded to bury.”

\(^{112}\) Numbers 15: 32-34.

\(^{113}\) The law is codified in Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:4: “These are they that are to be stoned…he who profanes the Sabbath,” but no cases are provided in any of the lengthy Shabbat discussion of any such execution.

\(^{114}\) Deuteronomy 23:24: “That which goes out of your mouth you shall observe and do.”

\(^{115}\) Sanhedrin 68a; Mishnah Haggigah 1:8: “Release from vows hovers in the air and they have nothing on which to lean.”

\(^{116}\) Genesis 9:6: “Whoever shed the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in God’s image did God make man.” Numbers 35: 33- “You shall not pollute the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the land, and the land can have no expiation for blood that is shed upon it except by the blood of him who shed it.”

\(^{117}\) Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:1-2; regarding inadmissibility of confessions see Sanhedrin 9b.
Tarfon and Akiva: "Had we been in the Sanhedrin, no one would have ever been put to death."  

There are a variety of halakhic tools that have shaped the Jewish understanding of Torah and have enabled the changing of a halakhic practice.

**Interpretation.**

Interpretation is the major tool for implementing a law differently than its literal reading. In the words of Rabbi Joel Roth, "...the meaning of the Torah is determined by the sages and...their interpretations alone are normative." There are three cases in the Talmud in which Torah commands are interpreted as only theoretical in their origins. The three cases are the rebellious child ( userEmail.getString(118) ), the idolatrous city ( userEmail.getString(119) ), and tzaraat of a house ( userEmail.getString(120) – a kind of fungal infestation, all of which are addressed in Sanhedrin 71a. Regarding each law there is a description of practical impediments barring implementation, followed by a Baraita that states concerning the law, “It never was and never will be. And why is it written? Learn it and you will receive a reward.” ( userEmail.getString(123) ). And for each law there is a statement made by a rabbi that he knows of an actual case in which the law was administered. A closer look at these three cases is warranted, because it is tempting to add mamzerut to the list of hypothetical laws.

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118 Mishnah Makkot 1:10. And yet, there is also a dissent expressed by Rabban Gamliel.
The Mishnah in Sanhedrin debates the requirements to qualify as a “rebellious son,” (מַרְעֵנָה בְּרֵעָן) for which the Torah’s penalty is death by stoning.\(^\text{120}\) The Talmud requires a finding that the child would unquestionably grow to lead a life of crime. To demonstrate fearless, easily repeated, moral depravity, a child needs to steal from his father and consume large quantities of meat and wine in a stranger’s domain. The Talmud goes one step further by closely examining the language of the Biblical law. Not only must both parents bring their son to the elders at the gates and agree with the desired outcome, but neither the mother nor father can have any physical handicap and both parents must have a similar voice and physical appearance.

The Talmud quotes the Baraita acknowledging that the requirements for “a rebellious son” will never be met. We may infer that the motive in crafting such impossible standards was that the rabbis found it morally unacceptable that a child would get the death penalty, let alone that his parents would choose to have their child executed. They are willing to see the Torah as providing laws that are only theoretical. At the same time, there are those who prefer to read the Torah more literally, such as Rabbi Yonatan who dissents and is quoted in a Baraita saying, “I saw a [‘rebellious son’], and I sat on his grave.”\(^\text{121}\)

To qualify as an “idolatrous city” (מֶלֶךְ בְּרֵעָן) the majority of the residents of a town in the land of Israel must worship idols. As a penalty the Torah states that the guilty parties must be killed, and the buildings in the city and the property of all the residents is burned, and the town may never be rebuilt.\(^\text{122}\) A Baraita asserts that there

\(^{120}\) Deuteronomy 21: 18-21.

\(^{121}\) There are two practical problems with this attribution. First, it is improper to sit on a grave. Secondly, Rabbe Yonatan was a cohen, which would have prevented him from going into a cemetery.

never was such a town. The statement is attributed to Rabbi Eliezer who said that even one mezuzah in town barred its classification as an “idolatrous city” and that there never was a town in Israel that failed to have at least one mezuzah. Again, Rebbi Yonatan is quoted as disagreeing by saying, “I saw [an “idolatrous city] and I sat on its rubble.”

Leviticus details the laws of a house that contracts a tzaraat discoloration of its walls.\textsuperscript{123} The house becomes an object of ritual impurity (\textgreek{\gamma\nu\psi}), which conveys impurity to people or objects within it, and must be destroyed.\textsuperscript{124} A Baraita declares that there never was such a tzaraat-inflicted house. It is attributed to Rabbi Elazer the son of Rabbi Shimon who declared that the tzaraat must be found on all four walls and the discoloration must meet at the corner. He makes this claim based on an interpretation of the relevant verses. In rebuttal there are two rabbis who testify to each having seen a ruin of a house in Israel- one in Gaza and the other in the Galilee- that were identified by local residents as a tzaraat-inflicted house.

Each of these Biblical laws teaches a foundational lesson. “The rebellious child” underscores that disrespect for one’s parents is tantamount to blasphemy and likewise warrants the death penalty. The law of the “idolatrous city” conveys that a person, particularly in Israel, is responsible for the faithfulness of his or her neighbors, because their idolatry could lead to destruction of the entire city. The “tzaraat house” is more obscure, both in terms of the nature of the tainted growth and the value lesson. Nonetheless, the rabbis understand tzaraat as a product of speaking ill of others (\textgreek{\gamma\rho\nu\alpha\kappa}), as shown by Miriam’s tzaraat after she spoke critically of her brother.

\textsuperscript{123} Leviticus 14: 33-57.
\textsuperscript{124} Leviticus 14:33-53.
Moses. Hence, the law of the “tzaraat house” teaches that hurtful speech may even lead to destruction of your familial home. At the same time, the actual administration of these laws could lead to unconscionable results, such as the capital punishment of a child, the destruction of an entire town, including the possessions and community of innocent people, and the demolition of a family’s home as a result of wrongful speech.

Apparently prompted by moral concerns, most rabbis understood that these laws were only hypotheticals. The Talmud justifies this outcome by presenting practical impediments, which are tenuously derived from the original Torah verses. There is unquestionably a “picking and choosing” of both how to interpret these verses and the holding that these verses were never meant to be implemented. At the same time, there are dissents, illustrated by “actual cases” of administration of the law that offer a literal reading and make no moral judgment.

In dealing with mamzerut, most rabbis sought on a case-by-case basis to ingeniously avoid labeling a person as a marital pariah. As with the three “hypothetical” laws, evidentiary hurdles were crafted that made the application of mamzerut far more cumbersome than expected from a literal reading of the text. Yet, the rabbis did not go as far as to say that “the law never was and never will be.” The rabbis failed to assert a decisive, practical impediment that would have consistently barred application of the law. Perhaps the rabbis felt that there was merit in keeping the law alive, even in a weakened state, due to social efficacy. A second lesson from the above debate is that there have always been dissenters regarding morally problematic laws, who choose to apply the Biblical law in a literal fashion.

126 Arakhin 15b, also cited as a rationale by Maimonides, Nahmanides, and Seforno.
It would solve a lot of practical problems to classify mamzerut as a “hypothetical law.” We regrettably have a long history of application of the law that does not allow us to say, “the law was never implemented.” The most important idea to come out of the survey of Sanhedrin 71a is that there is justification for having a law on the books as a value lesson, even when the law is not administered. When and if we utilize a halakhic tool to bar application of mamzerut, it does not mean that the law is meaningless. In addition, we may anticipate a dissenting opinion in a debate over mamzerut, a dissent that says, the law is in the Torah and therefore must be implemented. To change the precedent of the past, which saw mamzerut as operative, we must look to halakhic tools other than reinterpretation alone.

**Communal Legislation- The Takkanah.**

The Torah provides the sages with authority to administer the Law: “You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.”

The sages understood this verse as giving them the responsibility to interpret the law and to engage in legislative change. As Rabbi Joel Roth has written: “In the final analysis, the decision of an authority to exercise his legislative function is itself judicial, not legislative.”

The methodology and nomenclature for legislative-type change has evolved. Among the Tanaim (the rabbis of the 1st to 3rd centuries, CE), there is no

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127 Deuteronomy 17:11
128 Rashba relies on Deuteronomy 17:11 to say that it is a mitzvah to obey the sages changes of Torah- Rosh Hashana 16a, sv lamah take’in.
discussion as to the extent and guidelines of legislative action. Changes were made with undefined, broad categories, such as the following:

1. ληρθης ηβεστκ μακκ γ- "It is time to act for the Lord; They have violated Your Torah" (Ps. 119:126).

A sampling of changes justified with this Biblical verse:

- In response to sectarians who denied a “world to come,” the conclusion of a brakhah recited in the Temple was changed from “forever” (οκυγω ιν) to “forever and ever” (οκυγω σγω οκυγω ιν).131

- Although only a priest was permitted to wear the formal priestly garb, Shimon the Righteous, dressed as the priest to meet with Alexander the Great in order to seek his reversal of a decree giving the Samaritans permission to destroy the Temple.132

- Although the rabbis understood the Torah as mandating that “things intended to be oral may not be transmitted in writing,”133 Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish put the Aggadah into writing to prevent it being forgotten.134

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130 Elon’s Jewish Law at 504.
131 Mishnah Berakhot 9:5.
132 Yoma 69a.
133 Gittin 60b.
134 Gittin 60a.
2. /ןתנ, דא, ות רבעי, רענן- "It is better to uproot one letter from the Torah."

This phrase is often coupled with the goal of the "sanctification of God’s name." It was employed to justify specific acts by Israelite royalty that violated Torah precepts, such as:

- King David’s turning over seven of Saul’s sons for punishment to the Gibeonites in violation of the Torah standard that "sons should not die for the sins of their fathers."  
- Saul’s concubine delaying the burial of a person who was executed in violation of the Torah precept that a person was not to be left hanging after nightfall, “but must bury him the same day.”

3. סToEnd ובעי, כא פקידך ענה - "Sometimes the cancellation of Torah is its foundation". Used by Resh Lekesh to justify Moses’ shattering of the first set of tablets. Although not the violation of an explicit halakhah, Moses act is an example of abrogating God’s apparent initial intent.

These three broad phrases were largely used to justify, after the fact, one time, exigent acts. Nonetheless, the general category of legislation was also used to support an ongoing change that was felt necessary to preserve the Jewish tradition as a
whole. “It is time to act for the Lord; They have violated your Torah” was employed in connection with preserving the Aggadah, the oral explanations of the Biblical narrative, despite a Torah prohibition to do so. Afterwards, the rabbis continued to write down Aggadah and it constituted a precedent that enabled Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi (Palestine, 2nd - 3rd century BCE) to compose the Mishnah, a record of the “oral law.”

It is tempting to sweep aside mamzerut with the use of a broad phrase acknowledging that there is an exigent need to act. Yet, there is reason to pause and explore if there is a more precise category to justify overturning a Biblical law. It is always best to use no more force than necessary to make a change. Like the drilling of a hole, the skilled carpenter tries to find the bit size that most accurately matches the need. In fact, as the halakhah developed the broad categories were narrowed into more precise rubrics, which warrant a close look.

During the period of the Amoraim, the Rabbis of the 3rd-5th centuries, the Sages crystallized a number of basic principles that more clearly defined the scope and authority of their legislative activity. For purposes of our discussion there are two relevant categories of "uprooting a Biblical law" (םרמנג):

- סכ, כו חפ - "Sit and don’t do.” This principle was largely used to refrain from the communal performance of a mitzvah due to changed circumstances and a countervailing Torah precept. Hence, in order to protect against the violation of carrying from the private to the public domain on Shabbat, the Rabbis prohibited the following activities on Shabbat: the blowing of Shofar, shaking of the Lulav, and reading of the Megillah of Esther.\(^{140}\) In addition, the rabbis said that it was no

\(^{140}\) Sanhedrin 19a.
longer necessary to place a blue thread (יָרָן) on the four corners of one’s garments.\textsuperscript{141} Consequently, talitot for the past eighteen hundred years have customarily had white threads only.\textsuperscript{142} The reason for this social legislation is unclear, but seems to have arisen at a time when the Romans made it illegal or prohibitively expensive to acquire the blue die. It led to both hardship in fulfilling a mitzvah and encouraged the sale of counterfeit dies. The Rabbis ability to override a clear Torah command, recited in the daily recitation of the Shema, demonstrates once again the Rabbis’ authority to alter how a Torah law is implemented in response to changing conditions.

- προγνωμόνων - "Get up and do" [despite it being a violation of the Torah]. The right of the court to permit action in outright violation of the Torah was debated among the Amoraim. Rabbah held that such action was beyond the scope of rabbinic authority and Rav Hisdah said that it was permitted.\textsuperscript{143} Nonetheless, in the Talmud’s discussion of Elijah’s active violation of the law by setting up an altar on Mount Carmel, the prophet’s behavior is justified as a response to the exigencies of the moment (πραγματείας), the need to turn the people away from idolatry by a dramatic act.\textsuperscript{144} Later Posekim justified the use of “get up and do” in response to a ”crisis” even when the implications of the change were ongoing.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{141} Numbers 15:37-41; Menakhot 4:1; 38a.
\textsuperscript{142} Menakhot 43b, Rabbi Meir held that the omission of a white thread was an even more serious transgression than blue, because white was readily available.
\textsuperscript{143} Yevamot 89a-90b.
\textsuperscript{144} Yevamot 90b.
\textsuperscript{145} HaMeiri (Rabbi Menahem ben Solomon ha-Meiri, 1249-1316), Beit ha-Behira to Yevamot 89b, 90b; Ritba (Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Ishibli, 1250-1330) to Yevamot 90b, s.v. VeNegmar Mini; Rambam (Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, 1135-1204), Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:4. Maimonides justifies dramatic halakhic action by analogy to an amputation needed to save a human life.
such as believing a woman when she said that her husband had died\textsuperscript{146} and the rabbi’s authority to release a person from an oath.\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Akira}, "uprooting" was rarely employed and when used there was a preference for the less radical, "sit and don’t do" (παγγέλτω, κτυπάχω). The hesitancy to use “communal legislation” was out of respect for precedent and the belief that the laws of the Torah were given by God. \textit{Akira} was only justified in the context of a countervailing principle at stake (ρεκάκησσω όπως ονήμβητο) and an urgent need (παγά, τρομάω). In 1997 in response to the issues of "Solemnizing the Marriage between a Kohen and a Divorcee,” presented by Rabbi Arnold Goodman, we of the Rabbinical Assembly Committee of Law and Standards in 1997 permitted the "uprooting” of the Torah law as an act of παγά ουε - "Get up and do,” based on “the exigencies of the hour,” specifically our concern for Jews marrying Jews (endogamy). Our setting aside a de’oraita law affirmed our confidence as a \textit{Beit Din} in the face of the changed circumstances of our day.

\textit{Mamzerut} poses dramatic challenges, too, that at first impression warrant a bold response. Due to relatively new opportunities for an array of non-\textit{Halakhic} wedding ceremonies, many Jews are being remarried without a \textit{get}. There is a proliferation of \textit{mamzerim}, who are largely the products of ignorance or apathy rather than promiscuity. In addition, there are rare cases where Jews are having children in defiance of the law and if \textit{mamzerut} is enforced, their children would be left to suffer as marital pariahs. Punishment of children for the sins of their parents conflicts with a countervailing Torah

\textsuperscript{146}Tosaphot to Nazir 43b-ν ητσεβο. Additional cites in Tosaphot that affirm the rabbinic power of \textit{akira}: Yevamot 24b-ρντ; Yevamot 110a-κφητκν; Ketubot 11α-ηκηπηιγχυ; Bava Batra 48b-φβηκ.

\textsuperscript{147}Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 3:9.
principle as important as the need to preserve *Shabbat*, which overrode other Biblical laws. In our day, *mamzerut*, fails to achieve an objective of deterrence against forbidden sexual relationships and it cannot be justified on the basis of “communal purity.” As with the marriage between a *kohen* and a divorcee, we are committed to enabling the solemnization of marriages between Jews. There are grounds for the *takkanah* of uprooting the law of *mamzerut*, but there is a narrower category of *halakhic* change that is better suited. It is wise to operate in a *halakhic* realm in a way that meets our objectives and causes the least challenge to the larger system. In addition, this final category of *halakhic* change, the barring of a law through a procedural mechanism, has a history that is closely tied to concerns with evolving social and moral concerns.

**A Procedurally Inoperative Law.**

There are several examples cited in the Talmud of a Biblical law that was made inoperative due to a procedural decision. In each of the cases a rationale for the change is offered, but no express claim is made that the ruling is an *uprooting* of a Biblical law. Yet, the impact is the same. The following are three examples of judicial discretion that prevented implementation of a Biblical law:

*Avodah Zarah* 8b states that “forty years prior to the destruction of the Temple, the Sanhedrin abandoned [their normal place for hearing cases] and held its sittings in *Hanuth*” [a non-dedicated space for judicial use, also located on the Temple grounds.] Rabbi Nahman ben Isaac says the Sanhedrin’s decision resulted in the cessation of capital cases, “Why? - Because when the Sanhedrin saw that murderers were so prevalent that they could not be properly dealt with judicially, they said, ‘Rather let us be
exiled from place to place than pronounce them guilty [of capital offenses], for it is written (Deuteronomy 12:10), ‘You shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose,’ implying that it is the place that matters.”

When the rabbis stopped considering capital punishment, they did so despite the repeated Torah directive that execution was the just sentence for an array of crimes. They made the change with a procedural act. As they understood the law, a court could only impose capital punishment when the twenty-three-person Sanhedrin held its seat on the Temple grounds, ἡζυδω, a place that straddled the sanctity of the inner space of the Temple and the courtyard. The Sanhedrin decided to move from its place of authority, thereby barring the hearing of capital cases. The Sanhedrin’s motive for making the law inoperative was, to quote the Talmud, because “murderers were so prevalent that they could not be properly dealt with judicially.”

There are three possible explanations of their stated concern: capital punishment no longer served as a deterrent, or that the large number of cases could have led to incomplete examination of testimony and consequently unjust verdicts, or that the large case load could have led to unequal administration of who was tried for a capital crime. There is also a historical context to the Rabbi’s action: the Romans had officially taken away their authority to hear criminal matters. Regardless of which explanation or combination is chosen the bottom line remains the same: The Rabbis explained their suspension of a Biblical directive on ethical grounds.

148 Tosaphot on Avodah Zarah 8b- ὦμοι ὁμοιον μενον
149 Avodah Zarah 8b.
Moral concerns also prompted the rabbis to refrain from administering the Torah mandated laws of “breaking the neck of the heifer” and the *sotah*-water test. These changes are presented in a Mishnah in Sotah (9:9):

When murderers increased in number the rite of breaking the heifer’s neck was abolished…. When adulterers increased in number, the application of the waters of jealousy ceased; and Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai abolished them as it is said, “I will not punish your daughters when they commit harlotry nor your daughters-in-law when they commit adultery, for they themselves [their husbands, commit adultery, too^{150}].” (*Hosea* 4:14)

The law of “breaking the neck of the heifer” is stated in *Deuteronomy* 21:1-9 as follows:

If, in the land that the Lord your God is assigning you to possess, someone slain is found in the open, the identity of the slayer not being known, your elders and magistrates shall go out and measure the distances from the corpse to the nearby towns. The elders of the town nearest to the corpse shall then take a heifer which has never been worked, which has never pulled in a yoke; and the elders of that town shall bring the heifer down to an everflowing wadi, which is not tilled or sown. There, in the wadi,

^{150}This is the prevalent understanding of the reason that the *sotah*-water proved ineffective- see the commentaries of Maimonides and Chanoch Albeck. Albeck also cites the explanation of the Tosefta that the test proved ineffective because the adultery was public rather than secretive, see *(Φησις-ἐπηκτησίς σέμιν :χητι κ.) 9:9 σπυρὶς ἐσμεὶαν ηροὶς σαὶς ἄρχεις λύβφ*
they shall break the heifer’s neck. The priest’s, sons of Levi, shall come forward; for the Lord your God has chosen them to minister to Him and to pronounce blessing in the name of the Lord, and every lawsuit and case of assault is subject to their ruling. Then all the elders of the town nearest to the corpse shall wash their hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the wadi. And they shall make this declaration: “Our hands did not shed this blood, nor did our eyes see it done. Absolve, O Lord, Your people Israel whom You redeemed, and do not let guilt for the blood of the innocent remain among Your people Israel.” And they will be absolved of bloodguilt for the blood of the innocent, for you will be doing what is right in the sight of the Lord.

Despite the clarity of the Biblical mandate, the rabbis decided not to administer the law “when murderers increased.” Although the exact reasoning is unstated, it appears that the increase in murders meant that the dramatic ritual and public disavowal of responsibility no longer had social efficacy. Their decision to stop administering the law of the “breaking of the neck of the heifer” has meant that the law is inoperative down to our own time.

The sotah-water ordeal, named sotah for the tractate of the Mishnah that deals with the topic, is described in Numbers 5:11-31.\textsuperscript{151} When a husband accused his wife of adultery and she denied it, the priests were directed to administer a lie-detector test. The Priest prepared in an earthen vessel a potion of sacral water and earth from the floor of the tabernacle. The Priest declared before the accused woman that if she spoke

\textsuperscript{151} For an analysis of the topic see, Julian Morgenstern, HUCA, 2 (1925), pp. 113-143.
the truth no harm would come to her when she drank of the holy potion, but if she was lying then the waters would cause her belly to distend and her thigh to sag and she would be cursed among the people of Israel. She was bid to answer “amen, amen” to the Priest’s description of the potential curse. The Priest’s words were written down and then rubbed off into the water of bitterness, including the name of God, and the priest gave the mixture to the woman to drink. This test served to strengthen marital bonds as a deterrent to a woman’s secret unfaithfulness and as a remedy against a man’s unjustified jealousy.

The Priests’ refusal to administer this Biblically mandated law testifies to their sense of confidence and responsibility. The Mishnah explains that they stopped utilizing this ritual when “adulterers increased in number.” Again, the exact reasoning is left to speculation. Some later posekim wrote that the test itself became ineffective when the husbands were hypocrites, having committed adultery as well. In this explanation, the Priests had no choice, but to stop using the test since it no longer worked. In light of the other cases of Rabbinic discretion, such as regarding capital punishment and the breaking of the neck of the red heifer, there is reason to believe that the Priests made a unilateral decision based on moral and social concerns. The sotah-water test was only administered to women. When marital infidelity increased, it likely struck them as unfair to only put women through such an ordeal and as pointless, since the test no longer served as a societal deterrent against promiscuity. The suspension of the sotah-water ordeal demonstrated the priest’s willingness to set aside a Biblical law when it no longer served to meet its intended result and when its administration led to injustice.

As members of our community’s law-making body we are asked to reconsider whether mamzerut should have legal efficacy. Our predecessors on the
Rabbinical Assembly Committee of Law and Standards held that the Biblical law was “inoperative,” but they did not offer a halakhic explanation. The length of this teshuvah demonstrates the complexity of the matter. Yet, the bottom line remains the same. It is within our authority to refrain from using certain procedures, which effectively make the Biblical law inoperative. We have the precedents of Rabbis and Priests who refused to hear capital cases, who chose to no longer administer the Sotah-test, and who ceased to perform the ritual of breaking the heifer’s neck. In each of these cases, the prerogative of making a law inoperative was explained as a response to a change in the social situation that made the Biblical mandate ethically unacceptable or ineffective as a social mechanism.

In our day, mamzerut is both unconscionable and ineffective as a deterrent against sexual misdeeds. When we say that children should not suffer for the sins of their parents, it is not a morality of the hour, but an ethical perspective firmly rooted in our tradition. Admittedly, there are posekim who choose to read the Torah as calling on punishment of innocent children—whether the offspring of former neighboring nations or the children of illicit sexual relations. They are able to point to verses that said that God remembers the sins of parents on their children for generations. Yet, there is another strand in the rabbinic tradition that interprets the Bible to say that God only punishes children when they behave the same way as their parents. Rabbis throughout the generations have sought on a case-by-case basis to undermine the clear intent of the mamzerut law and effectively undermined its implementation in most cases. Yet, they did not solve the problem entirely.
In our day, we have witnessed a proliferation of *mamzerut* cases, most commonly as a result of ignorance rather than defiance of Jewish tradition. Branding a child as a marital outcast regardless of the parent’s intent troubles us. We have made a commitment in the past to enable Jews to marry other Jews even in the face of Biblical prohibitions. To disregard the behavior of parents in our decision to marry a Jewish child is not a radical act, but simply an affirmation of our ruling close to thirty years ago. Our decision, then and now, is to refuse to consider evidence of *mamzerut*, because the law in our day does not serve as a deterrent to sexual misconduct and instead undermines respect for Torah.

We have found a way to make *mamzerut* functionally inoperative. By refusing to entertain evidence of *mamzerut*, a choice that is our judicial prerogative, we have created an impediment to holding that a person is a *mamzer*. Consequently, if a person comes to us and says, “my Jewish mother thought my father was dead or divorced without a *get*, remarried, and then had me. What is my status?” We must answer, “I did not hear and will not hear anything that you say regarding your possible status as a *mamzer*. You are a full Jew. In the Conservative movement, we do not consider the category of *mamzerut* as operative, because we are committed to judging each person on his or her own merits as a result of the moral teachings of our tradition.” Even if we know

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152 Another common example of judicial discretion is the widespread refusal of rabbis to consider the evidence of intentional suicide regarding burial. The law in the Talmud and the Codes is that an intentional suicide is to be denied the honors of the dead, which was later understood to include burial in the Jewish cemetery (*Semachot* 2:1; *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avel* 1:11; *Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah* 345:1). This harsh punishment was rooted in the conviction that intentional suicide denied God’s sovereignty. Yet, a presumption was forged that a suicide lacked premeditation (*Semachot* 2:3; *Yad, Sanhedrin* 18:6). So far as minors are concerned the presumption was irrebuttable (*Semachot* 2:4-5; *Yoreh Deah* 345:3). In practice rabbis have not sought to rebut the presumption for adults either, in part of concern that the finding would cause distress for the mourners.
that a woman in our community divorced without a *get*, remarried, and had a child, we do not consider the status of the child as other than as a Jew.

When we read the verse in *Deuteronomy* that describes *mamzerut* there is still an opportunity to teach a moral lesson. The law of *mamzerut* conveys the profound seriousness with which the Torah presented the laws of sexual misconduct. Parents were warned with the most frightening threat: If you violate the norms of sexual behavior, your children will suffer. Nothing scares a parent more than harm to his or her child. The importance of sexual restraint remains a lesson implicit in *mamzerut*, even when choosing not to implement the law. *Mamzerut* becomes a theoretical teaching, parallel to the laws of the rebellious child, *tzaraat* of a house, or the idolatrous city. Unlike those precedents, we cannot say that the rabbinic tradition never enforced this law, but we may say that we no longer do so.

As a movement we are committed to the Torah being our moral guide, precisely because we take its Divine origins seriously. We cannot conceive of God sanctioning undeserved suffering. At the same time, we approach the *halakhic* system with respect and a desire to make changes in as small increments as necessary to meet our *halakhic* goals. As shapers of a life of Torah we are more ready to trim Torah’s branches, than to cut at her roots unless necessary. Through the procedural mechanism of making *mamzerut* inoperative we effectively prune a dangerous thorn. We are prompted to act due to a need to harmonize the moral teachings of Torah with her laws.

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153 Similarly, we find in the *Kitzur Shulchan Arukh* a related threat concerning masturbation: “Occasionally, as a punishment for this sin, children die when young, God forbid, or grow up to be delinquent, while the sinner himself is reduced to poverty.”
When we place the Torah in the ark we sing—“σχοινητησομηπογιαν—It is a tree of life to those who hold fast to it.”

The image conveys that the Torah offers spiritual nutrition, and comfort in times of need. Torah is also rooted and grounded and thereby defines our distinctive place in the world. Yet, the image conveys that like a tree Torah is also alive and growing. We are Torah’s gardeners. It is our duty to prune and shape the branches, which allows it to remain healthy and fruitful. Our prayer continues: ἀγαθὰς ἀκομήσωμεν—Her ways are the ways of pleasantness.

When a law of Torah conflicts with morality, when the law is "unpleasant," we are committed to find a way to address the problem. As a halakhic movement we look to precedent to find the tools with which to shape Torah. For the most part, we rely on the strategies of old. At the same time, we are willing to do explicitly, what was largely implicit in the past, namely to make changes when needed on moral grounds. It is our desire to strengthen Torah that forces us to recognize explicitly the overriding importance of morality, a morality which we learn from the larger, unfolding narrative of our tradition. We affirm the holding of the Rabbinic Committee of Law and Standards of the past that *mamzerut* is inoperative in our time. We affirm that when *mamzerut* is applied in our day it fails to meet a goal of deterrence and at that same time leads to an unconscionable hardship on innocent people. We affirm that we will not entertain any evidence of *mamzerut* and instead judge each Jew who stands before us as a person who is only responsible for his or her own wrong-doings.

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154 Proverbs 3:18. I am indebted to Rabbi Bradley Shavit Artson for drawing this analogy to my attention.
155 Proverbs 3: 17. The word ἀγαθὰς, translated as “pleasantness,” is consistently used in the *Tanakh* in the context of relationships.
**Pesak Din.**

We render *mamzerut* inoperative, because we will not consider evidence of *mamzerut*. We will give permission to any Jew to marry and will perform the marriage of a Jew regardless of the possible sins of his or her parent.