Contraception
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EH 5:12.2010

This responsum was unanimously approved by the CJLS on December 14, 2010.


שאלה—When is contraception permitted within Jewish law and what classical teachings should guide the decision to employ it? When contraception is permitted, does Jewish law determine which contraceptive method is preferable? Does Jewish law distinguish between contraceptive methods initiated prior to intercourse and “emergency” or other contraception introduced only after intercourse? What does Jewish tradition teach about an adolescent obtaining contraception without a parent’s consent?

תשובה—

Overview:

Judaism has always promoted marriage and raising children as mitzvot in themselves, as well as the foundation that enables the fulfillment and transmission of many other mitzvot. The relevant sources start in the very beginning of Genesis, with all humans being enjoined to follow the lead of Adam and Eve: “Thus shall a man leave his father and mother and cling to his wife, so that they become one flesh” (Genesis 2: 24). The tradition recognizes the value of the marital bond, including its physical component, separate from the issue of procreation. Additionally, rabbinic texts discuss how many children a couple should have and when their obligation to “be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and master it” (Genesis 1:28) had been completed. Finally, the obligation to protect one’s physical and mental health is a cornerstone of Biblical and rabbinic law. The sages discussed contraception explicitly, albeit in different terms and with different understandings of the human reproductive system. In cases where having another child would present physical or mental challenges to one of the parents, the rabbis permitted contraception of various types. Nevertheless, the use of contraception was always considered against a backdrop of sexuality within marriage and of a commitment to raising children. This teshuvah will apply classical rabbinic values to today’s experience and technology.

I. Relevant Halakhic Principles/Concerns

The Jewish discourse on contraception has identified four possible concerns that might incline against the unrestricted use of contraception 1) השחתת זרע לבל הָעָלָה (havdalah – the prohibition

BERKOWITZ/POPOVSKY 1
forbidding the unnecessary destruction of seed 2) – the prohibition against castration 3) – avoiding the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply and 4) the reluctance to encourage sexual activity outside of normative Jewish bounds. A ruling permitting the use of contraception first must show that efforts to prevent pregnancy do not raise any of these concerns or that the concern raised is outweighed by an even greater Jewish principle which is upheld through the use of contraception. Our discussion will begin by exploring each of the concepts in detail. Our analysis will show that both factor heavily in determining which particular forms of contraception are preferable over others, but neither one can serve as a basis to prohibit the use of contraception generally. It will further show that within the bounds specified, neither one of these concerns is sufficient to prohibit the use of contraception altogether. We will then turn our attention to the major classical discussions of contraception. Building on what we have learned, we will evaluate the most common contemporary contraceptive methods and discuss which most successfully avoid any of the concerns listed above. Finally, we will turn our attention to Jewish teachings that might inform our approach to issues of parental consent for the use of contraception by adolescents.

1. The Destruction of Generative Seed for Naught

The wasting of generative seed is not an absolute prohibition. The destruction of semen for naught is forbidden by Joseph Caro in the Shulkhan Arukh with spectacularly florid language. In contrast to the terse legal tone that characterizes most of the work, Caro writes regarding הפשוח זרע that עון זה חמור מכל עבירות שבתורה — this transgression is more serious than all of the sins in the Torah. He later cites Rabbi Elazar’s midrashic interpretation of Isaiah 1:15 suggesting that one who had emitted seed into his hand is akin to a murderer. There is no doubt that this prohibition holds a special status in Jewish law. In fact, David Feldman’s comprehensive work on the topic shows that the language in the codes appears positively restrained when compared to the hyperbolic discussions of this prohibition in many Kabbalistic texts. Caro’s primary definition of the specific act forbidden borrows from the Tannaitic euphemism דש מבפנים וזורה מבפנים—threshing on the inside and winnowing on the outside. However, it is clear that he reads the prohibition more broadly than coitus interruptus to include, at least, both masturbation and marrying a prepubescent girl. The

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1 The term הפשוח זרע is used interchangeably in rabbinic texts with הפשוח זרע לבטלה and השחתת זרע לבטלה.
2 אבן העזר כג א. אבן העזר כג ב. אבן העזר כג ג. אבן העזר כג ד.
3 David Feldman, Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law (Schocken, New York: 1975), pp. 114–119. The research in this work is impeccable. Our arguments here are greatly indebted to Rabbi Feldman.
4 בマתי של נה הב מנה בת ובית.
latter conclusion is of most relevance to this discussion because if intercourse with a woman biologically unable to conceive is considered הקדשה זרע, then it is possible that intercourse with a fertile woman in a situation where conception is prevented through the use of a contraceptive device or other means may also constitute a violation of the prohibition. However, Jewish legal decisors, including Caro himself, are unanimously and unambiguously clear that a couple not only may but must engage in sexual relations while the wife is pregnant, after menopause and in other situations when she is unable to conceive. Consequently, Caro’s concern cannot be that normal intercourse with a woman at a time when she is unable to conceive by itself violates the prohibition against הקדשה זרע. Observing this point, Rabbi Shmuel ben Uri Shraga Faivish, the author of the Beit Shmuel, (17th Century, Poland) rules that marrying a prepubescent girl does not violate הקדשה זרע; rather, Caro forbids it because it causes the man to delay his fulfillment of הפרוה ורבו—the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply. The interpretation of the Beit Shmuel offers a reading of Caro that avoids any internal inconsistency and is therefore normative. POSTponing הפרוה ורבו will be addressed in the next section. We can proceed here confident that nothing in the Shulkhan Arukh indicates that intercourse where conception is prevented violates the prohibition of הקדשה זרע.

To understand the full scope of the prohibition and its relationship to contemporary contraceptive methods, we must examine its source. Identifying that source, however, is not a straightforward matter. Most knowledgeable Jews assume that the prohibition against הקדשה זרע derives from the story or Er and Onan in Genesis 38:6–10.

Judah took a wife for Er his first-born; her name was Tamar. But Er, Judah’s first-born, was displeasing to the Lord, and the Lord took his life. Then Judah said to Onan, “Join with your brother’s wife and do your duty by her as a brother-in-law, and provide offspring for your brother.” But Onan, knowing that the seed would not count as his, let it go to waste whenever he joined with his brother’s wife, so as not to provide offspring for his brother. What he did was displeasing to the Lord, and He took his life also.

Er’s sin is not specified but it is widely accepted in the classical interpretive tradition that he was punished for the same act as his brother Onan. While the biblical language seems to indicate that Onan committed an act of coitus interruptus and this reading is confirmed by several midrashic sources, the interpretation offered by the Talmud is that the prohibited act was one of תשמיש שלא כדרכה—non-vaginal intercourse. Regardless of

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7 ابن העזר כ: בית שמואל. 8 ابن העזר כ: בית שמואל.
which reading one prefers, in both, the two men were punished following a sexual act in which conception was impossible. Neither the motives of the characters nor the specific rationale behind the severe punishments are made clear.

A broader reading would focus on the latter part of the verse, the motive rather than the specific means: beyond wasting his seed, Onan is also circumventing the Levirite system by which he is obliged to father children with his older brother’s widow, thereby maintaining his lineage. It is easy to imagine Onan’s disinterest in fathering a child that will be considered his brother’s. The Torah may be primarily concerned with Onan’s selfish refusal to build up his brother’s household. The severity of his punishment may well be due to combination of his transgressions. The motive behind Er’s sin is much harder to understand. The Talmud speculates that he may have wished to avoid risking Tamar’s beauty with the physical challenges of a pregnancy. The biblical commentary of Rabbi Yoseif Bekhor Shor (Yosef ben Yitzhak, France, 12th century) suggests that he did not want the trouble of raising children; for there are people who only worry about what is best for themselves.

The Talmudic interpretation and that in the Bekhor Shor both share readings of the text where the reasons for avoiding pregnancy are quite shallow. While we have been referring to the prohibition for convenience sake as שחתת זרע, the full term is שחתת זרע לبطل לبطل—the destruction of generative seed for naught. There is a redundancy in the term itself suggesting that violation of the prohibition requires not only “destruction” of the seed but also “destruction” for no purpose whatsoever. Certainly the particular reasons for Er’s behavior suggested by the Talmud and the Bekhor Shor qualify as “for naught.” However, these readings do not preclude other situations in which seed might be emitted outside of procreative intercourse for a halakhically valid purpose. Such cases would fall outside the bounds of the prohibition.

For example, one such halakhically valid purpose is proposed by the tanna Rabbi Eliezer who suggests to the husband of a nursing mother that the couple engage in coitus interruptus lest a second pregnancy diminish the mother’s milk and harm the suckling infant. While Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling in this specific case was rejected by his contemporaries, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (20th Century, U.S.) concludes from the discussion that cases must exist in which seminal emissions outside of procreative intercourse are not considered to be שחתת זרע לبطل. After noting that in other discussions Rabbi Eliezer rules even more strictly than his contemporaries in true cases of שחתת זרע לبطل, Feinstein writes,

9 Id.
10 בכור שור ברא' לחז.
11 יבמות לד ע' בבר.
12 אגרות משה א' סג' ה'.

BERKOWITZ/POPOVSKY 4
…with respect to [the destruction of] seed for naught, which is forbidden, the definition of “for naught” is not “nullified from the possibility of procreation such that it is impossible to procreate through such an emission;” rather, the definition of “for naught” is literal—for no need at all. However, when there is a valid need, for example to fulfill the mitzvah of pleasure [within marriage], even in a case when it would be impossible to procreate through such an emission, it is not considered “for naught” and, thus, is permissible.

Feinstein here cites the mitzvah of עונה—the injunction to engage in regular marital relations—as one halakhically valid basis for a seminal emission to take place outside of procreative potential without violating the prohibition against wasting generative seed for naught. It is important to remember that this narrowing the scope of what is included in the prohibition comes in the context of a case of coitus interruptus—the exact act of Er and Onan, following a plain reading of the text. Presumably, in cases where there is no דש מבפנים but rather the act is indistinguishable from procreative sexual activity, one might find even more room for leniency.

Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel, the fourteenth-century decisor also known alternatively as the Rosh and Asheri (France, Germany, then Spain), was asked about a case in which a married woman has an anatomical obstruction—אوتם—preventing normal intercourse. Though the details are unclear, one infers from Asheri’s restatement of the question that the obstruction permits the husband to penetrate the wife’s labia temporarily; however, the semen consistently spills out after the completion of the sexual act. He ruled,

יראה שהוא אסור; כיון דלעלולו היא וריה בתורה, קרין ביה: ושתא ארץ; וה"ע" שלפשטו.

It appears that [sexual activity in this case] is forbidden. Since he always winnows on the outside, the verse “he would cast his seed on the ground” applies to him. Even though sometimes he may thresh on the inside, nevertheless, because he always winnows on the outside, it is forbidden.

Interestingly, Asheri goes on to contrast the case before him with that of a woman employing a מוך—an absorbent device inserted internally which will be discussed in greater detail further on. Asheri would permit intercourse in the latter case, writing,

דהתם היא משמשת כדרך כל הארץ, אע"ש אין זרעו ראוי להזריע, מידי דהוה אעקרה וזקנה וקטנה.

[such a woman] engages in sexual activity in the same way as everyone else; even though his seed will not implant, it is analogous to [intercourse with] a barren woman, a post-menopausal woman or a woman too young to become pregnant [all of which are permitted].

13 ש"ה והרא"ש כלל ל"ג.
This responsum highlights an important distinction that is maintained in many later legal rulings. When the seminal emission occurs outside of the vagina, the verse from the story of Er and Onan—“he would cast his seed upon the ground”—applies and "השחתת זרע" is at issue. When the seminal emission is internal, even though procreation may be impossible for other reasons, "השחתת זרע" does not apply. Asheiri explicitly refers to intercourse which the introduction of a contraceptive method has rendered non-procreative as "normal intercourse." Of course, when we discuss modern contraceptive methods, we will see that some specific means of preventing pregnancy today—namely barrier methods—may be analogous to an external seminal emission and therefore much closer to "השחתת זרע". The key point at this stage of our argument is that intercourse with the use of contraception does not by definition fall within the bounds of the prohibition as long as the emission is internal.

Asheri explicates this point in his commentary on the Talmud. He writes,

דלא מיקרי השחתת זרע אלא בממי מזרע" him Hồמה שמרמא וידע בבלשלו... אבל שלוח

[The prohibition against] the wasting of seed for naught only applies when one causes an emission by masturbation or arousal, which is in itself causing the seed to go for naught... but after the semen has been emitted from the body, the prohibition against its destruction does not apply.

The laws of "השחתת זרע" govern the way in which semen is emitted. Acts that inhibit the reproductive capacity of semen following emission may invoke concerns about forestalling fulfillment of the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply (to be discussed below), but they do not cause an emission of semen to become a violation of "השחתת זרע". This conclusion is supported by a distinction made in a responsum of Rabbi Hayim Sofer which was later confirmed by Rabbi Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz, (1878–1953), known as the Hazon Ish. Sofer distinguishes between the improper emission of seed and the destruction of seed following emission. While the former constitutes a clear violation of "השחתת זרע", the latter stands outside of the prohibition.

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14 See, e.g., רמ"א אב"ד התו"ו כ"ג.
15 The interpretative trend has become increasingly lenient even with respect to situations where completion of sexual activity without withdrawal is not always possible. For example, Rabbi Eliezer Deutsch (early 20th Century, Germany) permits marital relations in a case similar to that before the Rosh because, in the case before Deutsch, expulsion of the penis was not guaranteed every time. Similarly, Rabbi Avraham Sofer (19th Century, Pressburg) permitted marital relations in a case even more similar to that before the Rosh on the grounds that medical technology might someday make normal intercourse possible between the couple.

Note also that the CJLS and other halakhic authorities have not applied the prohibition of "השחתת זרע" to external emissions of semen during the process of infertility treatment. See Ellior Dorff, Artificial Insemination, Egg Donation and Adoption, CJLS Responsa EH 1:3.1994; Aaron Mackler, In Vitro Fertilization, CJLS Responsa EH 1:3.1995 and sources cited therein.

16 See also חDirs איש אב"ד לו ב-ג.
17 See also חDirs נוספים אפשרים ל-ב-ג.
So far, we have assumed that השחתת זרע constitutes a biblical prohibition and we have concluded that an internal seminal emission does not fall under the prohibition of השחתת זרע simply because there is no possibility of procreation. We will now explore whether that prohibition is indeed biblical and if it is possible that even when a particular form of contraception appears on its face to involve השחתת זרע, whether one might still find a way to permit it in some instances when other halakhic concerns take precedent.

The biblical basis for the prohibition of השחתת זרע, something we have assumed up until this point, is far from clear. The term itself borrows language from Genesis 38:9 lending credence to Rabbi Vidal of Tolosa’s claim that the root of the prohibition lies in the story of Er and Onan. However, this a narrative section of the Torah from which few mitzvot are generally derived. Further, as we noted above and as Rabbi David Feldman explains in greater detail, the exact sins for which Er and Onan were punished are not obvious. Rabbi Jacob Emden concludes that the story of Er and Onan, at best, serves as a “hint” to the prohibition. He write, לא נזכר בפירוש בתורה רק ברמז — [the prohibition] is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah; rather only through a hint. Given this uncertainty, a host of alternate biblical sources have been proposed as the basis of the prohibition. One common claim begins with the observation that adultery is forbidden several times in the Torah. Employing a hermeneutic of economy, some rabbinic exegetes view the repeated injunctions as broadly prohibiting immoral behavior not specified elsewhere in the Torah. Maimonides represents one of many who view השחתת זרע as forbidden on these grounds. Still others point to a form of the root שחח ת employed in Genesis 6:12—“for all flesh had corrupted its ways on earth”—as suggesting that one of the sins for which God decided to flood the world in the time of Noah was the direct spilling of seed onto the earth. A comment in the Tosafot proposes that the prohibition is included within the positive command to be fruitful and multiply. Ibn Ezra finds it in Leviticus 18:6’s injunction against coming “near anyone of his own flesh to uncover nakedness.” Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger (19th century, Germany and Denmark) wonders if it might lie in the command at Deuteronomy 20:19 prohibiting wanton destruction. Each of these claims, despite their various exegetical merits, has occasioned significant objections. The reader here need not determine which single basis for the prohibition he or she finds most compelling. It is sufficient for the reader to acknowledge that biblical exegetes and legal decisors share no consensus as to the origins of the prohibition. The various biblical grounds proposed for the prohibition seem to

18 יד ה איסורי ביאה כא תומיסتحول מפselectors of the Talmud.
19 Feldman, supra note 4, pp. 144–165.
20 שומא תמטב תפש ס תומיס활동 מס.
21 פירוש במשנה סנהדרין ז ד and ספר מצות קס.
22 ספכר קמצות קפ ספכר מפרש תמשנה סנהדרין ז.
23 סנהדרין קח ע ב and ראש השנה יב ע א. See also נדה יג ע א ו"ם and מגן אברהם א ח ג.
24 ابن עזרה ויקרא יח ו.
25 בניין ציון ס קלא.
26 בינד ציון ס קלא.
serve more as אסמכות—biblical supports for rabbinic enactments—than as explicit biblical commands.  

Recognizing the uncertain etiology of the prohibition, Maimonides states that there is no punishment for a violation of השחתת זרע since there is no explicit biblical injunction. 28 Rabbi Moshe Trani (16th Century, Italy) equivocates when ruling if the prohibition is biblical or rabbinic, and the clearest reading of his statement suggests that he leaves the matter unsettled. 29 Perhaps the strongest argument for the non-biblical nature of the prohibition is made by Rabbi Yehoshua Heschel ben Yoseif of Krakow (19th Century, Poland), who astutely notes Rav’s statement in the Talmud that the transgressor of השחתת זרע is subject to a rabbinic ban—נידוי. Since such bans can apply only to the violation of rabbinic enactments and not biblical law, he argues that השחתת זרע must be understood as rabbinic in nature. 30

We argued above that the use of contraception by itself during intercourse does not constitute a violation of השחתת זרע even if the prohibition is understood to be biblical. Here we have shown that השחתת זרע need not necessarily be understood as a biblical prohibition at all. Considering the prohibition a rabbinic enactment certainly does not permit one concerned with Jewish law to ignore it. In the vast majority of instances this distinction between biblical and rabbinic prohibitions can rightly be viewed as purely academic. However, rabbinic enactments can be temporarily set aside or outweighed when they come into conflict with biblical obligations, pressing needs or risks to health. 31 Thus, should we determine that a particular form of contraception causes a seminal emission to become השחתת זרע, we still may not find that the prohibition of השחתת זרע constitutes an obstacle to permitting that particular contraceptive when it facilitates the mitzvah of עונה or serves a health benefit. Further on, we will apply this principle to various contemporary contraceptive means.

2. orho—Castration

Though the Bible does not offer a clear rule explicitly forbidding the castration of a human being, twice it prohibits men with damaged or maimed genitalia from entering into “the assembly of the Lord” - a statement understood to forbid marriage. The rabbinic discussions of these verses uncover two separate prohibitions. 32 One prevents a man—פצוע דכא—from marrying if his genitalia have been seriously injured, wounded, cut or crushed by the direct act of another man. The second forbids the permanent sterilization of either a man—סריס—or an animal by chemical or surgical means such as a vasectomy.

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27 This point is made more forcefully in涡ול נד.Enum א ש"ה פמי תורשע א"ה בmem.
28 פרוש תמשנה פנדה זפ. פירוש תמשנה פנדה זפ.
29 as understood inכנתת חיוא בכב as understood inכנתת חיוא בכב
30 נזכו נד Enumeration citing ש"ה פמי תורשע א"ה בmem.
32 אבב העזרה ה-ג.
There is some debate about whether the extension of the prohibition against סרוס to include women is biblical or rabbinic in nature. Regardless, most decisors who have considered the issue agree that a hysterectomy, oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries) or tubal ligation for purposes of preventing pregnancy alone, without other medical indications, would generally be included in the prohibition. However, both Rabbis Moshe Feinstein and Eliezer Waldenberg have permitted such operations for women when no other contraceptive means are safe.

Caro applies the prohibition to men even when the sterilization is effected by medical or chemical means instead of surgery. However, he permits women to drink a sterilizing potion—called here a “cup of roots”—so that they will not give birth.

One who gives a man or any other animals a “cup of roots” to drink in order to sterilize him, this is forbidden but the man is not flogged. However, a woman is permitted to drink a “cup of roots” in order to sterilize her so that she will not give birth.

The “cup of roots” and its capacity to serve as an analogue for contemporary contraception will be discussed below. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that the “cup of roots” was understood to be a permanent sterilization technique. The prohibition of סרוס is not concerned with temporary contraceptive methods that could be

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33 Arguments that the prohibition is biblical include ביאור הגר א א ה: כה and יא אกรม: יא א: כה: לאו. Arguments that it is rabbinic include והם התם של רשב״ח ו.assignment: יא ד:легו. אגרות משה א א ה: יא אגרות משה א א ה: יא אגרות משה א א ה: יא.

34 Waldenberg sets out his general guidelines for contraception and offers the order of priority. Tubal ligation is low on the order of priorities but permitted in cases where no other method is effective or safe. Waldenberg says it is not a matter of סיקסק נפש per se because the options of celibacy or divorce are available, but that these options would cause such severe hardship and possibly financial hardship that the operation would be preferable. He says the majority of poskim consider for women to be a rabbinic prohibition and that the actual source is the prohibition on harming oneself (habalah), so that if the procedure is done in a medically safe and painless way, with the woman’s consent, it does not fall under this category. Furthermore, it is possible to reverse the procedure and reinstate fertility, unlike the Biblical concept of sterility or סרוס and finally, the women is a passive participant, under anaesthetic—so is not really party to the action even if it were forbidden, but that it is preferable for a gentile doctor to perform the operation just in case the Jewish one would be liable. See also infra note 97.

35 Feinstein gives more weight to the Gra (Vilna Gaon) who considers סרוס even for women to be a biblical prohibition, and he says even if it is a rabbinic prohibition, not every rabbinic prohibition can be superseded just for the reasons of discomfort (tzaaar), however in the end he concludes that in the specific case of a woman who can not use other methods, celibacy or divorce would be a great discomfort (tzaaar gadol) and leave her like an agunah (an anchored woman) so that he calls this case an unusual circumstance (shaat hadhak) in which the decisors are almost forced into a corner to permit it. He harmonized the Gra’s view by saying that the other rishonim were also teachers of the Gra and that we can follow the majority, especially since some like the Rashba consider there to be no prohibition at all.

36 שלוחת טורר אבר עם היב.
discontinued at any time. With respect to men, both surgical and chemical methods are equally problematic. For women, the prohibition has not traditionally been understood to include chemical methods. Even surgical methods may be permitted for women in some instances.

3. Avoiding the Mitzvah To Be Fruitful and Multiply

The first couple, Adam and Eve, was charged with the command to “be fruitful and multiply” shortly after land and sea animals received the same imperative. Interestingly, rabbinic exegetes often locate the source of the mitzvah to procreate elsewhere in the Bible. Rashi, for example, follows the Talmud in arguing that the mitzvah stems from the command given to the children of Noah after the flood. In the same comment, Rashi also echoes a rabbinic tradition that one who fails to observe this mitzvah is to be considered as one who has shed blood. The importance of this mitzvah cannot be overlooked. A Talmudic passage indicates that “Have you fulfilled the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply?” is one of the first three questions a man is asked during divine judgment.

Hillel and Shammai debate the bounds of the biblical command. Shammai rules that a man has not discharged his obligation until he has fathered two sons. Hillel, whom the halakhah follows, is satisfied if a man has fathered a son and a daughter. The Talmud testifies that this is a minimal standard and that there is an additional rabbinic obligation to continue having more children after the requisite two. Two separate non-Pentateuchal verses are referred to in order to describe this non-biblical obligation. The first, to populate, derives from Isaiah 45:18, “[God] did not create [the world] a waste; rather to populate He formed it.” Since some offspring will die before reproducing, the rabbinic argument follows, sufficiently “populating” the world—that is, maintaining population stability—requires that couples have more than two offspring. A man cannot be said to have fulfilled the commandment until he has fathered two children who themselves have reproduced. לשבת can best be understood as a rabbinic expansion of the biblical command to ensure that the biblical command is fulfilled.

The second rabbinic injunction further expands the biblical imperative. לערב—into the evening, derives from Ecclesiastes 11:6, “Sow your seed in the morning and do not hold back your hand into the evening.” The verse is understood midrashically as demanding that a man continue to produce offspring “into

37 halakhah ייעוץ גmiscellaneous mishnah; תשובות הרמב”ן, ארכיון משנאות אוספים.
38 Genesis 1:22 and 1:28.
39 to Genesis 9:7 referencing וַיֹּאמֶר וַיִּשֵּּרֵא. See also התוספות יבמות מסע ב ד ופָּה וְלֹא יָרֵא שֵׁם אֱלֹהִים.
40 שֵׁם אֱלֹהִים וּלְאֵה אֵלָה וַיֹּאמֶר וַיִּשֵּּרֵא. See also יבמות וּלְאֵה אֵלָה וַיֹּאמֶר וַיִּשֵּּרְא.
41 See also יבמות יב יב. See also יבמות יב יב.
42 See also יבמות יב יב.
the evening” of his life; that is, a man should never stop fathering children. While this rabbinic injunction was not universally accepted in its day, the Talmud cites the affirmation of Rav Mattena that the later halakhah holds it to be valid. Post-Talmudic commentators debate the strength of the obligation to father children indefinitely. Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi views it as a standard rabbinic commandment. Rabbis Zerahia ben Yitzhak HaLevi Gerondi and Asher ben Yehiel both rule that this commandment is easily superseeded when it conflicts with other commandments. Nahmanides sets the level of obligation even lower calling it a general custom that one should attempt follow but not a strict rabbinic regulation. According to this view, there is no punishment for the transgressor. Codifying Nahmanides’ interpretation into law, Rabbi Yehiel Michael Epstein writes in his Arukh HaShulchan,

This is a type of embellishment to the commandment, a general custom, and if there is any impediment, we do not compel a man to fulfill it.

With respect to the obligation to father children, we see that fathering as many children as possible may be viewed as the ideal way to fulfill the mitzvah in the classical texts but that it is not necessary. When legitimate obstacles make such life choices difficult, one may fulfill the mitzvah of procreating with the rabbinic minimum.

The Talmud recounts a debate as to whether the mitzvah of procreating applies to both men and women or just men. Though the debate is not settled in the text itself, the later halakhic tradition has almost unanimously viewed the obligation as applying only to men. Rabbis Kassel Abelson and Elliot Dorff describe this interpretation as “counterintuitive” given the Mishnah’s clear indication that it understands the biblical text, on its face, to mean that both Adam and Eve were told simultaneously to “be fruitful and multiply.”

Jewish tradition views the obligation to have children as responsibility shared among parents. A comment in the Tosafot clearly indicates that the author believes women to be obligated to the rabbinic extension of the biblical command. Later responsa and codes temper this sentiment somewhat, but they retain a sense that a woman is actively involved in the fulfillment of the mitzvah at least, even if she is not directly commanded herself. Rabbeinu Nissim sees the woman as assisting her husband in the fulfillment of his mitzvah. Though it might not be a direct violation of the mitzvah of procreating for her to intentionally avoid becoming pregnant, a woman

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43 יבמות סא ע ב - סב ע ב.
44 יבמות סב ע ב.
45 החמאראות הנודדות; רא"ש יבמות סב ע ב; id. ad loc., and see also חמאראות הנודדות, סב ע ב.
46 ר"וצ"ה יבמות סב ע ב.
47 יבמות סב ע ב.
48 מלחמת השם ר"ף יבמות סב ע ב.
49 ערוך השולחן, אבן העזר א: יד;
50 ערוך השולחן אבן העזר א: יד;
51 ש. מ piston pump and seal.
52 ערוך השולחן אבן העזרים א: יד; and see also בחנים, א: יד.
behaving in such a way as to inhibit procreation would minimally represent a missed opportunity to participate in a central mitzvah.\textsuperscript{53}

Some responsa cite the exemption of women from the mitzvah of צא דוהת as a reason for a lenient ruling.\textsuperscript{54} The argument follows that only the man can be obligated unreservedly since pregnancy and childbirth were dangerous to a woman’s health in the ancient world and remain so today. Thus, they permit a form of contraception employed exclusively by the woman—e.g. hormonal contraception—that does not involve the man engaging in any direct action causing him to undermine the prohibition against spilling seed while also protecting the women’s health and autonomy.\textsuperscript{55} Though we have not presented a full argument here that the mitzvah should be reconsidered as applying to both men and women equally, our commitment to an egalitarian halakhic method prevents us from relying on this arbitrary distinction in our final conclusion.\textsuperscript{56} In a modern Jewish relationship, both parties should be equally involved in the decision to employ contraception. Whatever responsibility falls on one should be shared equally with the other. We are aware that hormonal contraception, the method that this teshuvah will conclude is most preferable, currently places the burden of use solely on the woman. Should similarly safe and effective hormonal contraception become available for men, we find no reason that the burden should remain on the woman.

Having explored the bounds of the commandment as set in the halakhic discourse, it is necessary to consider the nature of the obligation. מפר על ורבו is not a מצוה עשה שהזמן גרמא—a mitzvah that must be fulfilled at a specific time, such as the waving of the lulav and etrog on the morning of Sukkot. Neither is it a positive mitzvah that one must actively fulfill at all times, such as the command in Exodus 23:7 to “stay far away from falsehood.” Rather, מפר על ורבו is most accurately understood as a mitzvah demanding a particular lifestyle—a lifestyle that includes parenthood.\textsuperscript{57} A Jew who is able to become a parent is required to become a parent. Active decisions that prevent one from becoming a parent (e.g., commitments to celibacy, surgical sterilization absent health reasons, a refusal to have children) should rightly be considered acts of מלים פער ורבו—avoiding the mitzvah to be fruitful and multiple.\textsuperscript{58} However, decisions to delay pregnancy for a time, if they fit into a larger life plan that includes a desire to fulfill the mitzvah in the future

\textsuperscript{53} But cf. נדה יג ב (suggesting that women have a biblical obligation to serve their husbands’ sexual needs).

\textsuperscript{54} See, e.g. מנהל אלישע יב ב מה ש תבר א"ה הצ א"ה כ ב פ י. Because pregnancy and childbirth were frequently dangerous to a woman’s health in the ancient world, it could not be commanded for a woman to fulfill.

\textsuperscript{55} Even if women were clearly obligated to the mitzvah of pru u’rvu, this would not preclude the leniencies allowing contraception and abortion in cases where women’s physical and mental health are concerned; these leniencies are based on Biblical values of taking care of one’s body and health and would be weighed against the value of pru u’rvu. Similarly, this does not change the calculus for halakhic arguments permitting the use of infertility treatments.

\textsuperscript{56} See Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49, for one articulation of this argument in more detail.

\textsuperscript{57} It has been called מצוה שאין לה זמן מוגדר—a mitzvah that has no fixed time for its fulfillment. See ש"ע שם אב א ב פ י. We reaffirm the notion that Jewish tradition views infertility, an inability to find a mate and other situations of אונס where people who wish to become parents are unable to procreate.
are not necessarily acts of מнести פר ורבו. In the language of Rabbi Ya’akov Ariel (20th Century, Israel),

The mitzvah to be fruitful and multiply should not be considered an “immediate” obligation which one must always hasten to fulfill. When valid reasons exist to postpone it, it may be postponed.

Our argument here should not be read as carte blanche permission for couples to procreate only at their own convenience. We already saw the comment of Rabbi Yoseif Bekhor Shor above that the sin for which Er was killed was his decision to prioritize his own expediency and shallow needs over the burden of raising children. Similarly, Rabbi Meir Meiri writes that the commandment of פר ורבו needed to be given to human beings in the first place because, without the explicit imperative, we might prefer to avoid many responsibilities of childrearing—a decision that is wholly unacceptable in Jewish tradition.

Classic sources have identified a range of situations when delaying fulfillment of the mitzvah is appropriate. As with any positive mitzvah, fulfillment may be delayed when it poses a risk to one’s health or well-being. This permission to employ contraceptive means for reasons of the mother’s health has been widely adopted across the spectrum of rabbinic opinions. The debate only surrounds what level of health risk triggers permission to postpone fulfillment of the mitzvah. We urge a broad interpretation that includes emotional and psychological factors affecting the well-being of any of the parties involved as well as physical ones. Such an approach fits well within the classical halakhic discourse. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Rabbi Shimon Pollack advised a woman to use a spermicidal agent in order to delay birth of a second child at least one year after the birth of the first when it was clear that she might suffer fatigue and weakness bearing two children closely together. Rabbi Yehudah Henkin reports that he follows the ruling of his grandfather who would permit a woman to employ contraception for several years after the birth of a child, even if the husband had not yet fulfilled פר ורבו, whenever the mother thought that the prevention of pregnancy was necessary for her to provide appropriate care to her child. That is, not only is delaying פר ורבו acceptable to protect the health of the mother, but even the well-being of the child or another child already born is sufficient weight to temporarily postpone fulfillment of the mitzvah.

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59 שובה באחדת של תורא ז א”ל פ”ד.
60mittelbaz שמעון ז א”ל פ”ד.
61A representative selection of responsa which arrive at this conclusion include: הנד חלציו אה א”ל פ”ד, SHOPAHAVIM, translation.
62שובה יש משנת”א פ”ד, ת”א פ”ד ב”פ ת”א פ”ד ב”פ, ת”א פ”ד ב.”
63שובה בגוי בנים א”ל.
Closely related to such considerations of emotional well-being is the concept of שולחן בית—promoting domestic harmony. A full analysis of the concept is well-beyond the scope of this responsum. It should be sufficient here to note that the halakhic tradition has exempted individuals even from a range of biblical obligations when the absence of an exemption might cause significant discord within a family. In his work Terumat HaDeshen, Rabbi Israel Isserlin (15th century Germany) permits a widowed man to remarry a barren woman in a situation when failing to do so might otherwise lead to the man’s entering into a quarrelsome marriage with another woman. Isserlin’s ruling cites the dictum דדחינן בשביל קטטה מיבום לחליצה—“for the sake of avoiding strife, a levir may be absolved of his obligation to marry his sister-in-law.”

Though in this case Isserlin employs שולחן בית to exempt a man who has already fulfilled פרו ורבו from the rabbinic extension of לערב, the basis for his rule in the Talmud is a case when a man is exempted from levirate marriage—a biblical obligation. Consequently, שולחן בית might serve as a התר צד to permit temporary delay even when the biblical mitzvah of פרו ורבו has not yet been fulfilled.

We advise rabbis applying this ruling to the cases before them not to distort the concept of שולחן בית by employing it as a miscellaneous “catch-all” to permit any behavior. Nevertheless, with respect to the use of contraception, שולחן בית should direct rabbis to incline towards permissive rulings for newly-married couples who need additional time to strengthen their emotional bonds prior to facing the challenges of parenthood; for couples who have recently had a child and the introduction of another child soon afterwards might cause discord; for couples who have determined that spacing children is more conducive to a functional marriage and positive parenting; for couples very heavily burdened by the economic hardships of having a child; and for all similar situations when the well-being of the family or the marital relationship is threatened. Considers of שולחן בית may also influence the choice of contraceptive method; it needs to be one that both people agree on and does not negatively impact the frequency and quality of their physical relations. We refer the reader back to our discussion of פרו ורבו as a mitzvah demanding that one who is able adopt a lifestyle that includes parenthood. When a couple is committed to a realistic plan to raise children, temporary delays in having children to better enable a couple to fulfill their own overall plan to procreate should not be considered acts of perí הרוב. However, marrying and having children ought not be delayed intentionally beyond a time of reasonable fertility and the best chances to obtain healthy outcomes for parents and child.

64 Terumat HaDeshen א:санו כ. 65 Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg explicitly prohibits rabbis from weighing economic considerations when deciding whether a particular couple is permitted to use contraception. See ציץ אליעזר ט:ניאות. Issues of finances and livelihood should only play a determining factor in our analysis when they are so great that ignoring them would introduce a significant threat to שולחן בית. We expect such occasions to be both rare and temporary. Poverty alone does not warrant an exemption from the mitzvah of פרו ורבו. See שו”ת אבנ”ד ב. 66 Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49. Further, this discussion should not be misinterpreted to imply that today a man should hesitate to marry, or remain married, to a woman who cannot birth a child, or that a woman should hesitate to marry or remain married to a man who is infertile, regardless whether either partner has biological children. In our day, the obligation to have children can be fulfilled through artificial means and adoption.

Berkowitz/Popovsky 14
Further, all of the צדי הר סלעים and reasons not to view temporary postponement of the mitzvah as problematic that have been discussed above are applicable even before the minimum rabbinic requirement of one boy and one girl have been met. Certainly, a couple who already has two children could employ contraception in all of these situations plus others as well. While לערוב—having as many children as possible—may be considered in the classical tradition as the ideal way to fulfill the mitzvah and while Rabbis Dorff and Abelson have offered a cogent argument encouraging Jews to have three or more children, we understand that contraception can play a very helpful role in allowing couples to maintain good marital relations, in ensuring the well-being of the family, and in creating situations conducive to additional childbirth later on.67

4. Healthy Sexual Decision-making

Some voices in the contemporary discourse on contraception worry that increased information regarding and access to contraception might encourage unhealthy sexual decision-making, promiscuous behavior, and sex outside of marriage. Strikingly, this concern is absent in most of the major halakhic discussions of contraception to date, playing only a peripheral role in a few scattered responsa.68 Dr. Avraham Steinberg summarizes the Jewish fear to the degree that it exists as “the concern that a casual attitude to contraceptive use may contribute to a lower level of sexual morality.”69 When shades of this theme emerge in teshuvot, generally it is mentioned in passing as a potential concern but not as a reason by itself to forbid a particular form of contraception in a given case absent other restrictive factors.

To properly assess the weight that this concern should hold in the discussion, one must first evaluate the evidence confirming or denying its validity. Such an endeavor is difficult. Because dozens of factors coincide when an individual makes a decision about sexual behavior, isolating the role of any one factor is all but impossible. Scientific data do not exist suggesting that access to effective birth-control together with accurate information about its use increases an individual’s number of sexual partners. To the contrary, solid evidence shows that restricting access to effective birth control and information about it has no impact on the number of partners per individual or the frequency of risky sexual behavior across a population. At the same time, such restrictions have been shown to increase unwanted pregnancies and abortions.70 One recent study followed a large cohort of adolescent girls and observed the impact that access to emergency contraception—the form of contraception currently most feared as enabling promiscuity—had on behavior. The study confirmed that those girls who had

67 See ערוך השולחן, אבן העזר א:ח and Abelson and Dorff, supra note 49.
68 Admittedly, this may because most rabbis who have been asked to rule on the use of contraception in a particular case are asked by married couples.
easy access to emergency contraception engaged in risky sexual behavior in exactly the same proportion and frequency as those who did not have easy access.71

Encouraging the use of good judgment in sexual decision-making is a value that we hold dearly. We strongly encourage individuals to pursue sexual relationships within the guidelines set by the Rabbinical Assembly’s Rabbinic Letter on Human Intimacy, which affirms that sexual relations within marriage represent the highest ideal in Jewish tradition.72 It reads, “Only marriages can attain the holiness and communal sanction of kiddushin because it is the marital context which holds out the most promise that people can live by those views and values in their intimate relationships.” Therefore, our argument that permission to use contraception does not encourage unhealthy sexual decision-making should not be misinterpreted by the reader as an endorsement of non-marital sex.

We believe that the mechanism for limiting unhealthy sexual activity should be a communal effort that includes encouraging good judgment in personal and sexual decision-making: providing effective sexual education, modeling healthy relationships, and helping parents, teachers, rabbis, youth group leaders, and other role models to discuss these matters with their children at appropriate occasions. Attempting to reduce promiscuity by creating a situation in which people who choose to have sex outside of normative sexual relationships face disincentives or obstacles to obtaining appropriate contraception is profoundly ineffective. Further, it is harmful to those who become pregnant as a result and will only increase the number of abortions—a far more significant halakhic concern than the use of contraception.

II. Permissibility of Contraception

Our discussion to this point has shown that the prohibitions of רכוס והשחתה רעים do not forbid the use of contraception altogether. Instead, they favor some contraceptive means over others—a point to be explored further below. The concern that contraception will encourage unhealthy sexual decision-making or risky sexual behavior is not supported by scientific evidence and cannot serve as the basis for a Jewish prohibition against contraception. The most significant halakhic obstacle to the use of contraception is the delay and possible evasion of the mitzvah to procreate. Therefore, within marriage, contraception can only be permitted when necessary for the physical or emotional well-

73 Id., pg. 31.
being of a family member or when it represents one temporary element of a larger life plan to have children in a way that respects the other needs of the family members. Since the well-being of both the parents and the child could be compromised following an undesired pregnancy outside of marriage, this outcome should be avoided. While the rabbinic preference remains to achieve this through abstinence, contraception is permissible.

III. Preferred Means of Contraception

Once the decision to use contraception is made, careful consideration must be given to the particular contraceptive means. Our discussions of והשחתת זרע and סריס have suggested that some modern means of contraception may introduce various halakhic challenges. Before our direct consideration of which particular forms of contraception are preferable, we will turn to the classical rabbinic discussions of contraception for guidance.

1. מוך—An Absorbent

The Talmudic sages knew of several methods for preventing pregnancy. The mitzvah of עונה made abstinence within marriage halakhically unviable. The laws of niddah made timing intercourse to periods of reduced fertility difficult. At one point, the Talmud refers to a series of post-coital exercises designed to inhibit fertilization. The method appears to have obtained rabbinic acceptance, but no evidence suggests that it was widely practiced or particularly effective. It was not suggested in the other places where rabbis discuss prevention of pregnancy.

The most common contraceptive method discussed in rabbinic literature is a מוך—a tuft of wool inserted into the vagina either prior to intercourse in order to block sperm from entering the cervix or following intercourse in order to absorb recently deposited sperm. One source reports that it was common for prostitutes to use a מוך. On its face, the passage offers neither approbation nor condemnation for the practice. It is simply descriptive.

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The most direct discussion of the permissibility of the מוך is found in a baraita,
Rav Bibi taught before Rav Nahman: Three women use an absorbent—a child, a pregnant woman and a nursing mother. A child—lest she become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman—lest her fetus become a sandal. A nursing mother—lest she wean her child prematurely and he dies...these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say, both [women in these three categories] and [women not in these three categories] have intercourse in the usual way; mercy will come from the heavens as it is said, “God protects the innocent.”

There are two debates among commentators: one on the meaning of the Hebrew (may or must) and the other on whether the מיכר may be used before or after intercourse. The Hebrew term ממששות, translated here as “use,” is ambiguous in its context. It could correctly be understood either as “may use” or “must use.” Both readings were proposed by early interpreters of the text. Rashi preferred “may use.” Following this reading, both Rabbi Meir and the sages agree that women outside of these three categories are prohibited from using a מיכר during intercourse. Rabbi Meir, fearing the tragic outcomes specified, permits an exception to the general prohibition for women in the three categories listed. The sages believe that the prohibition against using a מיכר during sex is so strong that no exception can be made even for women in these three categories. Underlying this reading is an assumption that the מיכר—at least when inserted prior to intercourse—renders the seminal emission והשתה💝 as the semen is inhibited by a foreign object.

Rabbeinu Tam, alternatively, preferred “must use.” Following his reading, the debate is entirely different. Both Rabbi Meir and the sages agree that all women may use a מיכר. The sages view women in these three categories as no different from other women; consequently, they too may or may not use a מיכר as they wish. Rabbi Meir, on the other hand, views these women as especially vulnerable; consequently, he mandates that they must use a מיכר to prevent harm. He concurs with the sage that women not in such danger may use a מיכר at their own discretion. According to Rabbeinu Tam, the debate here is not about how far a prohibition against the מיכר extends. In fact, there is no prohibition against the מיכר at all. Rabbi Meir and sages disagree instead about whether Jewish law should mandate the מיכר when there is a possible health risk to pregnancy.

Interestingly, Rabbeinu Tam agrees with Rashi, his grandfather, that a מיכר inserted prior to intercourse would cause the emission to be a violation of והשתהész ותית. He describes it as כמטיל זרע על העצים ועל האבנים—as if one spilled his seed on wood and stones. Therefore, Rabbeinu Tam believes that the מיכר described here must be a post-coital absorbent that allows the emission to take place without any interference. Intercourse proceeds as normal, without the interference of a foreign object, and the semen is later rendered non-procreative. He makes the comparison to intercourse with a barren woman which is definitely non-procreative and yet undeniably permissible.

Readers of the text following Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam have had to determine which interpretation they find most plausible. Strong arguments have been made either way and need not be rehearsed at length here. We favor the reading of Rabbeinu Tam for the
reasons given by many Rishonim: Rashi’s reading has the Sages actively forbidding a woman from taking precautions to prevent endangering herself or her child; this seems highly implausible. It is much more consistent with related rabbinic teachings to adopt a reading in which the Sages would permit such precautions even if they are unwilling to mandate them.

As to the second debate, the halakhically-oriented commentary of Rabbi Morechay ben Hillel cites Rashi’s son-in-law, Rabbi Yehudah bar Natan—Rivan—in favoring the reading of Rabbeinu Tam. He permits the use of a מָךֶר after intercourse but is silent on the use of a מָךֶר inserted prior to intercourse. In the responsa cited above, Asheiri permits even a pre-coital מָךֶר describing intercourse with a מָךֶר in place as “intercourse in the normal manner”. Rabbi Solomon Luria reaffirms Asheiri’s permission for all women to use a pre-coital מָךֶר, rejecting the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam that intercourse with a מָךֶר already in place would constitute הנשחת וּרְשָׁע. Luria asserts that Rabbeinu Tam has no basis to argue that the מָךֶר here would be any different. His ruling is affirmed in several later responsa. Rabbi Isaiah Karelitz, author of Hazon Ish, labels Luria’s insight on this point רוח הקודש—divinely inspired. Consequently, this interpretive tradition holds that intercourse with a מָךֶר does not violate הנשחת וּרְשָׁע.

However, this reading of the baraita is not universally accepted. Rabbi Meir Posner does not voice a preference for either the reading of Rashi or Rabbeinu Tam, but he asserts that it is best to rule strictly and to forbid the use of a מָךֶר even after intercourse. Similarly restrictive rulings were reached by Rabbi Akiva Eger, his son-in-law, Rabbi Moses Sofer, and Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger, who goes so far as to forbid the use of a מָךֶר even in situations where there is a risk of physical harm. Despite this restrictive tradition, we find the approaches of Asheiri and Luria to follow from more plausible readings of the baraita and ultimately we concur with their more permissive halakhic rulings.

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77 See, e.g., חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב; and מָךֶר מָךֶר מָךֶר א בֶּית בֶּית בֶּית ב. 78 The counterargument claims that if the risk were significant at all, the sages would certainly have permitted use of the מָךֶר but since the danger to the women in these categories is so extremely remote, the sages did not feel compelled to grant an exception to the prohibition. See חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב; and ישמח לב יד ד ד. 79 מָךֶר מָךֶר מָךֶר א בֶּית בֶּית ב. 80 A comment made by Asheiri in חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב suggests that he has reached a conclusion contrary to that cited here. This comment is discredited, however, by most contemporary decisors. See, for example, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein who writes of the seemingly inconsistent comment, "This is not the writing of the Rosh, but..." 81 See חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב. 82 Later commentators vary in how limited a use they assume was accepted for the מָךֶר. See Feldman, supra note 5, pp. 172–173. 83 חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב. 84 חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב. 85 Twentieth-century rulings which follow in this tradition include חידושי ריתב: א יבמות יב ע ב; and ישמח לב יד ד ד. The two works cited in footnote 78 are both commentaries on the Talmud.
The authority that Luria commanded might have been sufficient to dictate a more lenient trend in subsequent legislation. Instead, his writings were insufficiently available, and other commanding authorities were unaware of their existence. Without his permissive lead to guide them, luminaries such as Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Hatam Sofer, and others, analyzed the matter on their own and came to cautious conclusions because “I have seen no precedent authority that permits.” Their own influence and prestige being so substantial in Hungary, in the rest of Europe, and in the Jewish world generally, a non-permissive school arose that inspired such statements as “How can I permit, seeing that Eger and Sofer have forbidden?” With the discovery of Luria’s bold analysis, based as it was on both precedent and logic, such statements began to give way to others, as “Had Eger and Sofer seen what Luria wrote, they never would have forbidden.”

Having traced considerations of the מָכַר through rabbinic and halakhic texts, we must now wonder what the implications of this discussion are for contemporary contraceptive methods. Consistent with our conclusions above, the discussion of the מָכַר teaches that intercourse with no possibility of procreation does not necessarily violate the prohibition of השחתת זרע. Nevertheless, it does suggest that intercourse in the context of some particular forms of contraception may constitute השחתת זרע. Though Asheiri and Luria rule more permissively and do not view the use of a מָכַר inserted prior to intercourse to be השחתת זرع at all, we have observed that many authorities read the baraita as teaching that a foreign object that physically prevents sperm from entry past the cervix is comparable to כמטיל זרע על העצים ועל האבנים—as if one spilled his seed on wood and stone. Such a reading would then strongly favor contraceptive methods that permit natural unobstructed intercourse and inhibit the reproductive capacity of the sperm through other means—e.g., hormonal contraception. Though we accept Asheiri’s and Luria’s rulings, the plausibility of the reading offered by Eger and his followers together with the weight such a reading has been given in subsequent halakhic discussions should incline us towards preferring forms of contraception other than barrier protection when all issues of safety and efficacy are equal, despite our confidence that barrier protection is not, by law, prohibited. Regardless of Posner’s claim to the contrary, we see no coherent way to read the baraita that would prohibit the use of a מָכַר following intercourse—the modern analogue being a post-coital douche.

2. כוס של עקרין – The “Cup of Roots”

Despite the profound implications that the above baraita holds for contemporary discussions of contraception, it is virtually ignored in most classical halakhic compendia. Discussions of contraception in the codes focus exclusively on another contraceptive means discussed in rabbinic literature, כוס של עקרין—the “cup of roots”—a sterilizing potion also sometimes called כסא דעקרתא—the “cup of infertility.” The Tosefta states clearly,

86 Feldman, supra note 4, pg. 300.
A man is forbidden to drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize himself but a woman may drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize herself.

The basis of the prohibition against men employing this contraceptive method is the rabbinic concern to avoid סרוס, discussed above. Because the biblical prohibition against סרוס falls only on men, the rabbinic prohibition of an act short of סרוס—the ingestion of sterilizing chemicals—should only fall on men as well. 88

The Talmud recounts the story of Rabbi Hyya’s wife, who had difficulty in previous childbirth, disguising herself to ask for a halakhic ruling from her husband. When he ruled that the mitzvah of פרו ורבו did not apply to women, she drank כוס של עקרין in order to permanently sterilize herself. When Rabbi Hyya realized her deception, he expressed disappointment that he would not have an additional children, but he did not suggest that her actions had violated any prohibition. 89 We saw above that the Tosefta’s ruling permitting כוס של עקרין to women is codified without qualification. 90

What is striking about the rabbinic כוס של עקרין and its prominence in later halakhic sources is that it invites no discussion at all about a possible violation of השחתת זרע. Through this unanimous opinion of the poskim we see an additional confirmation of our conclusion that intercourse with a woman even when there is no possibility of reproduction does not represent an act of השחתת זרע. This is true even when the sterilizing agent is permanent; certainly then there would be no concern of השחתת זרע with the introduction of a chemical that renders a woman temporarily infertile, such as the hormonal contraceptive methods to be discussed below. The only concern with a כוס של עקרין is one of סרוס. Currently, no male hormonal contraception is approved for use in the United States. The agents in development have serious drawbacks and are far from market. Should a male hormonal contraceptive become available that, like hormonal contraception for women, can be stopped easily with a quick resumption of fertility, we would likely permit its use as the prohibition discussed here is specific to permanent chemical sterilization—the only form known to the Sages and later codifiers.

87 תוספות יבמות תב.
88 This argument interprets the version of the statement commonly printed today. But see the textual variant: “A man is forbidden to drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize himself and a woman may drink the cup of roots in order to sterilize herself.” This variant reading then challenges validity of halakhic conclusions drawn from the story of Rabbi Hyya and his wife infra. The version cited above is the version accepted by later authorities. See infra note 90.
89 תוספות יבמות תב.
90 See also see also; שולחן ערוך אבן העזר שם ו在同一.
**Contemporary Contraception**

Having analyzed the relevant halakhic principles underlying the rabbinic considerations of the מוך and the כוס של עקרין, we are now ready to apply those principles directly to the forms of contraception available today. Some forms of contraception are halakhically prohibited in all cases unless there is a medical necessity beyond the prevention of pregnancy. Abstinence within marriage is prohibited because it violates the mitzvah of הענה. Surgeries such as a vasectomy, tubal ligation or tubal obstruction are prohibited because, unless done for reasons of health, they constitute an act of סרוס.\(^91\) Fertility awareness strategies, commonly referred to as “the Rhythm Method,” are not by definition prohibited, but because the implementation of such methods makes simultaneous observance of הענה and תורת משפחה so difficult, they are unlikely to serve as a viable option for most religious Jewish couples.\(^92\)

The choice of which method to employ should be made in conversation with a physician who can help the individual evaluate specific health risks that may influence the decision and determine which methods may prove most effective given an individual’s lifestyle, personality, age, goals and family situation. We take seriously the principle underlying the rabbinic dictum חמירא סכנתא מאיסורא—avoiding harm is a more serious concern than violating a prohibition. The primary factors in deciding among these options must be safety and efficacy.\(^93\)

The following methods of contraception will be discussed in order of their preferability within Jewish tradition from most preferable to least preferable; however, this ranking holds only in a situation when all the methods are presumed to be equally safe and effective for a given individual. If a woman elects to employ a method of contraception farther down the list for reasons of safety or efficacy specific to her circumstances, she may rest assured that such a choice represents a halakhically valid decision, fully justified within normative Jewish practice. The following list should not be misunderstood as a moral ranking of contraceptive methods but rather it serves as a set of guidelines to help a woman or a couple to use traditional Jewish values when selecting among options that are determined to be equally safe and effective for her.

**Hormonal Contraception**

\(^{91}\) Rabbi Yitzhak Ya’akov Weiss rules that a vasectomy, even when the spermatic cords are tied and not cut, violates both the prohibition of סרוס and פצוע דכא.


\(^{93}\) As rabbis, it would neither be prudent nor proper for us to give medical advice. The determination of what means of contraception will offer the best risk/benefit profile for a given individual should be made in consultation with a qualified healthcare professional in consideration of the best available medical evidence.
Hormones designed to inhibit ovulation may be ingested orally, injected into the muscles, or slowly released into the bloodstream via implanted rods, a transdermal patch or a removable vaginal insert. Regardless of the method of administration, hormonal contraception is most analogous to the כוס של עקרין—the significant difference is that the כוס של עקרין caused permanent sterilization while hormonal contraception can be stopped at any time with a speedy resumption of fertility afterward. Because the כוס של עקרין presented no concern of השחתת זרע as it allows intercourse to proceed unimpeded by a foreign object, hormonal contraception represents the most preferable halakhic method of birth control at present when it is at least as equally safe and effective for a particular woman as other means of birth control would be given her unique health and behavioral profile.

The different methods of administration allow for varying doses of slightly different hormones. The most important factors in deciding on a method of administration should be limiting the health risks that each option might pose for a specific individual and the ability of a woman to comply with the delivery protocols—that is, a woman likely to forget to take a pill daily might find a weekly patch to be more effective, etc. However, in the event that all methods of administration present an equal safety profile and efficacy rate for a particular woman, Jewish tradition would incline towards preferring a pill, a patch or an insert. Each of these methods can be stopped easily, and baseline fertility can be resumed with minimal delay. Intramuscular injections (in the US, depot medroxyprogesterone acetate, sold under the brand name Depo-Provera) require a slightly longer delay before fertility returns. Implants (currently sold under the brand names Implanon and Jadelle) can always be removed with a quick resumption of fertility afterwards, but because a physician is necessary for their removal, delays are likely. However, since the possible delays in returning to full reproductive ability are not extensive following the decision to discontinue implants or injections, the halakhic preference against them is slight and could easily be outweighed by other factors for a particular individual.

94 The reader might wonder if hormonal contraception delivered via a vaginal insert (currently sold in the United States under the brand name NuvaRing) should be considered more analogous to the כוס של עקרין since a foreign object remains in the vagina during intercourse. This analogy however is false as the ring neither blocks entry of sperm past the cervix nor does it absorb semen. Intercourse with a similarly constructed insert without the hormones would result in pregnancy rates equivalent to intercourse with no contraception at all.

95 Hormonal contraception can also be used to regulate, delay or altogether eliminate menstrual cycles. The most common protocols include 21 days of active agent followed by 7 days without, allowing for monthly cycles; 84 days of active agent followed by 7 days without, allowing for one cycle every three months; or active agent without interruption, allowing for the indefinite suppression of menstruation. Couples will likely wish to consider how the various cycle options would affect the dynamics and rhythms of their sexual relationship, from the perspective of the framework of the sanctity of family relations and other physical psychological, emotional and esthetic considerations. For discussions of the terminology, background, meaning, and evolving practices of sanctity of family relations, see recent responsa of the CJLS, "Mikveh and the Sanctity of Family Relations, An Introduction" by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz, "Mikveh and the Sanctity of Being Created Human" by Rabbi Susan Grossman, "Observing Niddah in Our Day" by Rabbi Avram Reisner, and "Reshaping the Laws of Family Purity for the Modern World" by Rabbi Miriam Berkowitz, available at http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/law/new_teshuvot.html.
Intrauterine Devices (IUDs)

An intrauterine device (IUD) is a small T-shaped object inserted into the uterus by a healthcare professional. The exact mechanism by which IUDs prevent pregnancy is not well-understood. It is widely believed that the exposure of the uterus to a foreign body initiates an inflammatory reaction that is toxic to sperm. Should fertilization nevertheless occur, the mucus developed in response to the inflammation inhibits implantation. Despite the concerns of some prior halakhic authorities who feared that the device might actively destroy implanted embryos, current scientific evidence strongly supports that an IUD does not function as an abortifacient.\(^{96}\)

At present, un-medicated or inert IUDs are not approved for use in the United States though they are common worldwide. The only IUDs available for use by women in the United States release copper ions (sold under brand name Paragard) or progestin (sold under the brand name Minera). Though the specific mechanisms of action vary depending on the specific device implanted, all can be considered equivalent from a halakhic standpoint since no solid evidence suggests that any IUD interferes with live pregnancy after implantation.

Though an IUD is a foreign object, it cannot properly be considered analogous to the מוך since it does not prevent entry of the sperm past the cervix. Sperm transverse the cervix in exactly the same manner as they would without the implantation of the device. Consequently, no violation of השחתת זרע exists even according to the opinion of those who hold more strictly than we do and view intercourse with a מוך in place as a possible violation of the prohibition. Rabbi Immanuel Jakobowitz expressed hesitance about permitting an IUD, not because it violates השחתת זרע but because he feared that it might effect an abortion.\(^{97}\) As noted above, the scientific evidence today does not support this concern, and it is not echoed in the later opinions of such contemporary Orthodox decisors such as Rabbis Eliashiv, Auerbach and Neuwirth.\(^{98}\) Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg initially ruled that a diaphragm should be preferred over an IUD since the diaphragm does not actively lead to the destruction of sperm.\(^{99}\) However, he later reversed his earlier ruling, favoring the use of an IUD over both a diaphragm and even oral contraception because of its safety and efficacy.\(^{100}\)

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\(^{97}\) ישראל יאקאוויטש, "שאלות והערות בעינונים רפואיים שונים", נועם תשכ"ג ור"ע.

\(^{98}\) נשמת אברהם אבן עזרא, "יב ליר (ג, ז)".

\(^{99}\) ציץ אליעזר ח' ס' נא.

\(^{100}\) ציץ אליעזר ח' י ס' כה (י)
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein prohibited the use of an IUD altogether. While he did note the above concerns, the primary basis for his ruling was the irregular bleeding caused by early IUDs and the difficulty that such bleeding would impose on women observing the laws of tohorat mishpahah. Such bleeding is much less common with contemporary IUDs than was the case when Feinstein offered his ruling. Nevertheless, it still occurs, especially within the first several months of use; since it is uterine bleeding, it still requires separation and immersion, unless one follows the recommendation of Rabbi Susan Grossman to disregard the status of zavah (irregular bleeding) altogether.

Diaphragms & Cervical Caps

A diaphragm is an individually fitted rubber device inserted prior to intercourse which blocks the cervix. The term “cervical cap” could refer to a number of similar barrier devices including the Prentif cap, FemCap and Lea’s Contraceptive. Cervical caps do not require individual fitting by a trained clinician, but because their mechanism of action is so similar to that of the diaphragm, they can be considered as equivalent for halakhic analysis. At first, the diaphragm appears to represent a much closer analogue to the מוך than an IUD because its primary means of function is to prevent entry of sperm past the cervix. However, most early authorities considering the diaphragm and its predecessors reject this analogy and find the diaphragm to be much less halakhically problematic than the מוך. Many decisors who view the diaphragm as generally forbidden to women nevertheless permit the diaphragm on the grounds that it does not absorb the sperm and destroy it; rather, a diaphragm simply prevents live sperm from entering the uterus. Rabbi Shalom Schwardon likened use of the diaphragm to intercourse with a pregnant woman which, of course, is permissible—in both cases, the entryway to the uterus is closed. Rabbi David Hoffman leaves no room for doubt in his ruling.

That a physician or midwife seals the entrance to the womb with an appropriate covering, in this I see no basis for or suggestion of a prohibition since it does not destroy the seed but rather it prevents the seed from entering the womb.

Rabbis Feinstein and Isaac Weisz are the two twentieth century decisors who expressed the greatest reservations about the use of a diaphragm. Both reject Schwardon’s assessment and view a diaphragm as closely analogous to the מוך. Since both of these
authorities, in contrast to us, view theḥameshahat ha’avot as forbidden to women not at an elevated health risk, they permit the use of a diaphragm only in limited instances of medical necessity. Though we are neither convinced that a diaphragm should be viewed as an analogue to aḥameshahat ha’avot nor that the use of theḥameshahat ha’avot is to be permitted only in as narrow a range of circumstances as they prescribe, we take Feinstein’s and Weisz’s opinions into account when we rule that there is a slight halakhic preference for the IUD over the diaphragm assuming all issues of safety and efficacy are equal for a particular woman. Since even the concerns of Feinstein and Weisz can be addressed adequately through the use of hormonal contraception or an IUD, such means of contraception should be preferred when possible.

Of note, current medical guidelines do not recommend use of a diaphragm or cervical cap without the simultaneous use of a spermicide. Our understanding of ḥameshahat ha’avot, outlined above, limits the prohibition to the improper emission of seed and not the destruction of seed following emission; so, we do not consider the use of a spermicide to violate ḥameshahat ha’avot. Nevertheless, another reason that we find a halakhic preference for hormonal contraception and IUDs is that neither of those two methods involves the active destruction of sperm which, even if not a technical violation of the prohibition, remains sub-optimal.

Sponges

The contraceptive sponge is a small circular disk moistened with tap water prior to insertion permitting a proper fit. The only sponge sold in the US at present, the Today sponge, contains spermicide as a secondary means of contraception. An untreated sponge would have exactly the same halakhic status as aḥameshahat ha’avot. That is, according to our analysis of the sources above, it would be permitted to all women. The addition of the spermicide invites the concerns noted in our discussion of the diaphragm and causes the contemporary sponge to be less halakhically preferable even though it is permissible.

Condoms

The term condom describes a membrane made of latex or a similar substance used to create a barrier between the penis and vagina during intercourse. The term “female condom” refers to a plastic cup inserted into the vagina and anchored by an external ring. Though used differently, both will be considered as equivalent for halakhic purposes since both serve as a complete barrier preventing semen from entering the vagina. A condom does not simply prevent sperm from passing the cervix, but it keeps sperm outside of the vagina altogether. For this reason, most decisors worry that the use of a


107 Another drawback of diaphragm or contraceptive sponge is that they must be inserted prior to intercourse, thus adding a certain amount of inconvenience and reducing spontaneity. Since this affects onah, the marital pleasure aspect of the relationship, a couple may weigh them as relevant factors.
condom may violate the prohibition of השחתת זרע. The emission of semen directly onto the membrane, following this view, constitutes a contemporary version of Rabbeinu Tam’s articulation—כמטיל זרע על העצים وعلى האבנים—as if one spilled his seed on wood and stones.

Definitive rulings regarding the use of a condom vary significantly, but unqualified permission to use a condom cannot be found in the responsa literature. Rabbis Moshe Feinstein and Dov Weidenfeld prohibit the use of a condom even to prevent a physical danger to the woman. A broader group of decisors permit it only in limited circumstances to prevent danger, *i.e.*, if the woman would be at a health risk were she to become pregnant, or when no other contraceptive means would be safe and effective. Many others who permit the use of a condom, do so only when the minimum requirement of אשת儿 (a boy and a girl) has already been fulfilled and a transgression of השחתת זרע would be at most rabbinic.

Even though we accept that intercourse with a מוך does not violate השחתת זרע, we do not consider a condom as analogous to a מוך because, with a condom, the emission is interrupted. However, our analysis above that the prohibition of השחתת זרע seems to be rabbinic in nature allows us to permit the use of a condom when it is the best means available for one to fulfill a biblical obligation such as the mitzvah of יציקה. Even in such cases however, the above contraceptive methods should be preferred whenever possible. One advantage to the condom is that it has almost no side effects—a benefit not shared to the same degree by other effective contraceptive methods. It is also cheap and easily available. However, it can fail even when used properly. The condom may be used by anyone for whom no other contraceptive means are safe and available.

Also of note, the above discussion has focused exclusively on preventing pregnancy. The condom has a second important function: to reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases—a benefit that no other contraceptive method provides to the same degree. While a full discussion about healthy sexual decision-making is far beyond the scope of this responsum, it is clear that anyone engaging in sexual activity carries a responsibility to themselves and their partner to take all appropriate precautions necessary for avoiding sexually transmitted diseases. When a condom represents the best way to meet this obligation, there is no doubt that the possible violation of a rabbinic prohibition—השחתת זרע—is far outweighed by the much more serious consequences of contracting or transmitting a life-altering disease. The prohibition, while serious, is not so immutable that a person’s health should be jeopardized in order to observe the strictest interpretation of it. However, for monogamous relationships in which both partners are tested and found to be disease-free prior to having sex, this benefit of the condom is less relevant.

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108 דרבן מזירוה ת"א סכ"מ ואר точноו מסוה ת"א ו"ו ב"ז סכ"מ ו"ו ד"ז סכ"מ.
109 See, e.g., אגרות משה א"ב ס"ז ו"ו אגרות משה א"ב ס"ז ו"ו ת"א ס"ז ו"ו מ"ג ס"ז.
110 ביב ו"ז והשהו ד"ז ס"ז ו"ו ביב ו"ז והשהו ד"ז ס"ז ו"ו מ"ג ס"ז.
111 For some, the use of a condom will inhibit יציקה. This certainly represents a halakhic concern of significant magnitude to factor into a couple’s decision-making.
Postcoital (Emergency) Contraception

The term postcoital contraception—commonly called “emergency contraception”—refers to any drug or device employed after intercourse to prevent pregnancy. One effective method is to insert an IUD within 72 hours of intercourse. However, because of the expense and necessary involvement of a trained clinician to place the device, it is rarely used for this purpose. Far more common today is the administration of hormonal agents that prevent pregnancy in a variety of different ways. Though several hormonal agents may be used, clinical guidelines currently recommend a high dose of levonorgestrel (sold in the US under the brand name, Plan B) taken as quickly as possible following intercourse or two smaller doses taken twelve hours apart by women for whom the higher dose is contraindicated.113

Levonorgestrel and other postcoital contraceptive agents function almost identically to hormonal contraception administered prior to intercourse inhibiting fertilisation of any eggs released by any sperm that is still active and by causing changes to the endometrium to prevent implantation of the fertilised egg. Were both contraceptive means equally safe and effective, we would see no significant basis for a halakhic distinction between them, and we would permit postcoital hormonal contraceptive in all cases when precoital hormonal contraception is permitted. Ironically, the former is closer to what the stricter interpreters of the *braita* of the three women would permit, though the latter is intuitively more palatable to many today because it avoids the unfounded concerns about the proximity to abortion. However, the efficacy of levonorgestrel as emergency contraception is difficult to assess and is widely presumed to be less effective than precoital hormonal contraception.114 Further, though no confirming data is available at present, some physicians have expressed concerns about possible health risks were a woman to use it repeatedly over time.115 Consequently, postcoital hormonal contraception should never be a couple’s preferred method for preventing pregnancy, but when another contraceptive has failed, was used improperly or not used at all, emergency hormonal contraception constitutes an acceptable halakhic measure.

It is important to clarify the mechanism of post-coital hormonal treatment. The exact mechanism of action varies from person to person depending on a range of factors, including when in the cycle the hormone is administered. Levonorgestrel may delay ovulation, interfere with fertilization, interrupt tubal transport, prevent implantation by altering endometrial receptivity, or cause regression of the corpus luteum—a remnant of the follicle following ovulation necessary to maintain pregnancy. Regardless of how the agent works for a particular individual, the pregnancy preventing action always takes

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place prior to implantation. Peer-reviewed data shows that emergency contraception is completely ineffective once a conceptus has implanted and pregnancy has begun; it functions through a variety of means to prevent the implantation of a fertilized embryo.\footnote{Anna Glasier, “Emergency Postcoital Contraception,” \textit{New England Journal of Medicine}, 1997 337:1058–1064.} Therefore, although emergency contraception can interfere with the implantation of a zygote, it should not be confused with the “abortion pill” or any other abortifacient which terminates a pregnancy after it has begun.

Abortions are sometimes induced medically, but not with levonorgestrel. The only FDA-approved protocol for a medical abortion at present calls for an oral dose of mifespristone—a synthetic steroid sold in the US under the brand name Mifeprex and commonly referred to as RU-486—followed two days later by a dose of prostaglandin to induce contractions. The FDA has approved the use of mifespristone as an abortifacient until the 49th day from the start of the woman’s last period. Mifespristone terminates a pregnancy after the embryo has implanted by blocking progesterone, a hormone necessary to maintain pregnancy. Confusion between medically induced abortions and emergency contraception is common.\footnote{Complicating matters further is the fact that some physicians administer a small dose of mifespristone shortly after intercourse to function as emergency contraception instead of levonorgestrel. This limited use of low-dose mifespristone within the first five days of intercourse should be halakhically equivalent to the use of levonorgestrel as emergency contraception and permissible. However, the more common use of full-dose mifespristone to induce an abortion following implantation should be distinguished from the use of mifespristone as an emergency contraceptive.} Since full-dose mifespristone is intended to terminate a developing pregnancy, it should be viewed as an abortifacient.\footnote{No CJLS teshuvah has yet addressed this question directly. There are times when abortion is permitted in Jewish law, particularly during the first 40 days which is when full-dose mifespristone is administered. The following CJLS responsa discuss abortion generally: David M. Feldman, "Abortion: The Jewish View" HM 425:2.1983a; Robert Gordis, "Abortion: Major Wrong or Basic Right? " HM 425:2.1983b; Ben Zion Bokser, Kassel Abelson, "Statement on the Permissibility of Abortion " HM 425:2.1983c; Kassel Abelson, "Prenatal Testing and Abortion " HM 425:2.1983d; Isaac Klein, "A Teshuvah on Abortion " HM 425:2.1983e.}

Our broad permission for emergency contraception rests on a premise that pregnancy begins with the implantation of the fertilized egg in the wall of the uterus—usually about five days after fertilization, which itself may occur up to 72 hours after intercourse. Acts preventing implantation are thus viewed as contraceptive, and acts terminating pregnancy after implantation are viewed as abortive. Since setting the start of pregnancy at implantation may not be intuitive, we must support our claims above by explaining why we view implantation as the proper starting point for pregnancy from a halakhic perspective.

Lending credence to the counterclaim that pregnancy might begin prior to implantation, the rabbinic counting of the length of a pregnancy begins from the time of intercourse, not implantation.\footnote{נדה ח ח א–ב.} However, it is important to note that prior to Leeuwenhoek’s invention of the microscope, very little was known about the specific mechanism of pregnancy. Most historians believe that the female ovum was not even identified until...
Consequently, the wisdom of our Sages was limited by the incomplete scientific understanding of their day. Further, as implantation can only be detected with the assistance of modern testing equipment, the rabbinic direction to count from the time of intercourse may have been nothing more than a very practical suggestion for a time when no other starting point could have been contemplated. New scientific or medical information need not always trump halakhic precedent, but it must be addressed directly by halakhic authorities lest the tradition sever itself from the world which it governs. 

David Feldman offers several compelling examples of how rabbis have adjusted the halakhic discourse surrounding pregnancy as new technologies allowed for a more accurate understanding of the process. For us not to follow in this path would represent an abdication of our responsibility to employ all of our faculties for the sake of making proper halakhic judgments.

Today, implantation is accepted with broad consensus throughout the medical community as the starting point of pregnancy. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists declares, “Conception is the implantation of the blastocyst . . . A pregnancy is considered to be established only after implantation is complete.” Definitions used by the National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration are similar. It is with implantation that a woman’s hormonal system begins to respond to the embryo, initiating the cascade of physiological changes associated with pregnancy. Even the most sensitive pregnancy test will display a negative result prior to implantation. Further, it is estimated that between one-third to one-half of all fertilized embryos fail to implant. From the woman’s perspective, this is indistinguishable from menstruation. Certainly, such a woman is not generally considered as having lost a pregnancy.

The CJLS has already adopted several responsa holding that an embryo in a laboratory does not have the status of a fetus because implantation represents a necessary condition for pregnancy. We find no significant halakhic difference between a fertilized egg in a Petri dish and one in a fallopian tube. Neither can properly be considered as on a trajectory towards life until implantation has occurred—an outcome that is far from certain and depends on other factors in both cases.

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122 Feldman, *supra* note 4, pp. 140–143.
Consequently, we view emergency contraception—which prevents implantation—as halakhically equivalent to hormonal contraception administered prior to intercourse.\(^\text{127}\) The halakhic preference for precoital use of hormonal contraception rests primarily on the presumed safety and efficacy benefits for most women.

**Parental Consent or Notification for Adolescent Use of Contraception**

The *Rabbinic Letter on Intimate Relations*, incorporated by this teshuvah, affirms that the Jewish values governing permissible sexual relationships are inconsistent with sexual activity during adolescence; other decisors of Jewish law have affirmatively prohibited non-marital sex altogether.\(^\text{128}\) Consequently, in an ideal Jewish setting, the use of contraception would be a moot issue for minors. We encourage all those involved to help teens "recognize that sexual intercourse is not an isolated act with little or no effect on the rest of our lives. . . . Sex should be seen . . . as one important part of our human existence which is tied to all the other parts and which therefore affects, and is affected by, the totality of our lives."\(^\text{129}\) When a teen engages in sex because of peer pressure, a series of harmful consequences may result. However, Jewish adolescents do have sexual relationships, and an honest halakhic consideration of the issues must not ignore this fact.\(^\text{130}\)

A full acknowledgement of this insight should lead the adolescent to discuss his or her sexual behavior with parents and other trusted adults. We encourage the adults involved in those conversations to provide accurate information about contraception and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. Were these conversations to occur in all situations, we would hope that a child’s seeking access to contraception without a parent’s knowledge would prove to be rare. However, we further recognize that these conversations do not always happen and that some adolescents will seek to obtain contraception without the consent or knowledge of a parent.

At first, it might appear that Jewish tradition holds a bright-line standard for the capacity to consent for oneself—the age of *bar/bat mitzvah*. Those who have not yet become *bar/bat mitzvah* are halakhically considered minors and would need parental approval.

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\(^\text{127}\) Even though Rabbis Shlomo Auerbach and Yehoshua Neuwirth both rule much more restrictively than we do with respect to contraception generally, they both concede that emergency contraception does not function as an abortifacient and may be employed following coerced sex.

\(^\text{128}\) Even though Rabbis Shlomo Auerbach and Yehoshua Neuwirth both rule much more restrictively than we do with respect to contraception generally, they both concede that emergency contraception does not function as an abortifacient and may be employed following coerced sex.


Those who have become bar/bat mitzvah are considered adults and, though parental assent would be greatly preferred, it would not be absolutely required. However, in practice, Jewish law has not applied this standard in all cases, preferring instead definitions of majority narrowly-tailored for a specific purpose; for many situations, adulthood does not begin until a later chronological age.\(^\text{131}\) In others, the beginning of adulthood varies depending on the person’s intellectual, emotional, financial or other status.\(^\text{132}\)

Previous halakhic sources have not addressed the question of parental consent for contraception, and there is little precedent for which particular standard should be applied here. One discussion in the Talmud proposes setting the age of consent for a woman at the age when she is able to bear children,

> אמר רב ספרא: בנייה ומענה מבעיה. ואית דאמר: בנייה ומענה מבעיה.\(^\text{133}\)

[Bearing] children serves as a sufficient determinant of adulthood [even in the absence of classic markers or chronological age]. Some say that [bearing] children represents a better determinant of adulthood [than classic markers or chronological age].

Though the ability to bear children would make a poor test for adulthood across the board, we argue here that it constitutes the best halakhic test for majority with respect to questions of consent for contraception because it is consistent with the best scientific data available at present. That is, laws requiring parental consent or notification for access to contraception up until the age of 16 or 18 have repeatedly been shown to increase the number of abortions, teen pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases without decreasing the frequency of adolescent sexual activity.\(^\text{134}\) Those who argue for mandating parental involvement in the decision-making process do so because they believe that mandating such involvement will foster an environment in which adolescents make safer decisions. Unfortunately, the best evidence available does not support this belief and, in fact, shows that such mandates lead to less healthy decision-making across

\(^{131}\) For example, a person’s right to sell his father’s land and a man’s obligation to engage in military or Temple service begin at the age of twenty. See הגדה המוכה: יב, סל"ק.

\(^{132}\) A son still supported by his father financially is considered a minor for many purposes even after the age of thirteen. See מסכת ברכות: כט, פ"י.

\(^{133}\)יבמות יב ע"ב.

a population. Further, the evidence suggests that such mandates can increase the likelihood of acts of domestic violence.\textsuperscript{135}

The reader is strongly cautioned against misunderstanding our adoption of this standard as a statement that parents need not be involved in the sexual or medical decision-making of their adolescent children. To the contrary, Jewish tradition places great value on consistent, direct communication between parents and children and argues that parents should be actively involved in the major life decisions made by adolescents. Further, it demands that clergy, teachers and other adults behave in ways that facilitate and model this communication. The adolescent who elects not to involve his or her parents in such an important decision clearly acts against the intent of these deep-seated Jewish values. Our point here is simply that Jewish law does not directly mandate parental consent or notification for access to contraception. Instead, the tradition seeks to involve parents in the lives of their children by creating environments and establishing relationships that are conducive to robust parent-child communication.

**Summary/ Psak:**

Jewish law enjoins those who are physically and mentally able to procreate and raise children to have a minimum of two offspring. A recent opinion of the CJLS has increased this to three whenever possible.\textsuperscript{136}

Contraception may be used before, after, and in between pregnancies if there is a compelling physical or emotional well-being justification. However financial concerns that go beyond obtaining basic necessities and other issues of convenience are not generally considered sufficient reasons.

Safety and efficacy are the primary criteria for determining the most halakhically preferable means of contraception. Because the medical and behavioral issues affecting safety and efficacy will vary for each couple, it is a decision that should be made with a healthcare professional and blanket halakhic generalizations should be eschewed.

Assuming that all aspects of safety and efficacy with respect to more than one contraceptive method are equal for a particular couple, the couple is advised to follow the order set out in this teshuvah for most to least preferable means:

* Hormonal contraception (the pill, implants, vaginal insertion, transdermal patch).
* Intrauterine device- copper or hormonal (IUD)
* Diaphragm, Cervical cap
* Sponge, including spermicidal gel; spermicidal gel in combination with another method.


\textsuperscript{136} Dorff and Abelson, \textit{supra} note 49.
* Condoms
* Emergency contraception (“the morning after pill”) – only after the fact and not for regular use.

If a woman elects to employ a method of contraception farther down the list for reasons of health, safety or efficacy specific to her circumstances, she may rest assured that such a choice represents a halakhically valid decision, fully justified within normative Jewish practice.

Birth control of any means is far preferable to abortion. Every effort should be made to ensure access to and accurate information about contraception for all who might engage in sexual intercourse. The concern that such measures will encourage risky sexual activity or promiscuity is unsupported by scientific evidence and insufficient to warrant the increased health risks born by those in communities where access to contraception is limited.

This teshuvah views full-dose mifespriestone intended to terminate a developing pregnancy as an abortifacent. As such, a determination of its halakhic permissibility should be considered in light of the Jewish laws on abortion and not the laws of contraception discussed in this Teshuvah.

Jewish tradition places great value on consistent, direct communication between parents and children. Parents should be actively involved in the major life decisions made by adolescents. However, Jewish law does not mandate parental consent or notification for access to contraception. Where there is concern for the safety of the adolescent or the threat of domestic abuse, care should be taken to be particularly lenient in this area.